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János Kornai* 
The Soft Budget Constraint 
 
I first expressed my thoughts on the soft budget constraint in a lecture series I gave at Stockholm 
University in 1976. Two years later came my first publication to deal with it (along with other matters). 
That piece appears in this volume as Chapter 1.1 Almost four decades have passed since the idea was 
conceived, and during that time, all those of us who have dealt with the problem have advanced in 
understanding it. The introduction to this volume sums up how I interpret the soft budget constraint 
today, in 2014, and reviews the research done into explaining and analyzing it.  
 
The soft budget constraint syndrome 
 
The syndrome 
I have taken the expression syndrome from medicine, to mean the set of symptoms – recognizable, 
observable phenomena – absent from an ideally healthy organism. There can be one or more causes for 
such a set of symptoms to develop. 
 Medical science strives to find causes, but clinical practice must set about treating the syndrome 
even if the causes are still not sufficiently understood.2 In living organisms, a syndrome will usually 
appear in several variants: here one, here another symptom or group of symptoms will appear more 
strongly, while others are less apparent or fail to appear at all. 
 Economists make only sporadic use of the expression syndrome, apt though it is for describing 
some phenomena in economic organisms. Although it is not customary to refer to the crisis syndrome 
of the capitalist economy, for example, I gladly do so. There are many kinds of crisis with many kinds 
of symptoms and many kinds of factor to explain their development. Yet they have something in 
common: all the various types of crisis frequently appear bundled together. 
 That is the sense in which I use the expression soft budget constraint (SBC) syndrome in what 
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The major common feature of the many variants of the SBC syndrome is as follows: the behavior of 
every organization concerned is affected by the expectation that it will be bailed out if it gets into 
serious financial trouble. Each of the expressions in this basic interpretation calls for more detailed 
explanation. 
 There are many types of budget-constrained organization in whose behavior the SBC syndrome 
may appear: households, firms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), investment projects not tied 
to a for-profit enterprise,3 distinct local government organizations (LGOs) within the apparatus of state, 
or other publicly funded institutions, and finally, central government on a national level. Initially SBC 
researches were centered on the enterprise sphere, but they later spread to organizations of other types. 
 The above basic general statement refers to “serious financial trouble,” but consciously avoids 
denoting its specific nature. At the outset of the research, the concern was that state-owned enterprises 
under the socialist system were chronic loss-makers, yet did not need to close their gates because the 
state covered their losses. However, that is but one variety of serious financial trouble; the initial 
stimulus for a bailout may also come from several other phenomena. One of any of the organization 
types listed may fail financially, being unable to cover its due expenditures, or service its accumulated 
debt, or raise new loans having lost its creditworthiness. Another case of financial trouble is one that 
stimulates a bailout if the catastrophe has already occurred, or if it is foreseen that the organization 
stands on the brink of such catastrophe and the bailout comes in time. The breadth of the definition 
covers both single bailouts of single troubles and regular bailouts in response to chronic troubles. 
 When SBC researches began, the rescuer was the state (the central administration or some 
distinct organization within it). Later researchers notice the existence of several other types of rescuer 
or subsidizer: a large bank or bank consortium (Treisman 1995), or a private or public foundation. 
Bailing out at an international level were international organizations such as the IMF or  the 
administrative bodies of regional associations, such as the EU. 
 Initially the bailout method that attracted most attention were single, repeated, or possibly 
regular state subsidies. This was the form most commonly associated with bailout. In fact rescuing 
parties had a wide variety of means available to them: full or partial remission of debt, changes in fiscal 
law to ease the tax load on rescuees, rescheduling of debt, full or partial exemption from tax, or lending 
to uncreditworthy borrowers. Where the main income of a rescuee came from products or services sold 
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at controlled prices, these could be raised. 
 Key constituents in the definition of the SBC syndrome are expectation and behavior. There are 
many misunderstandings surrounding them. Some view soft budget constraint and bail-out as 
synonyms, but far from it: where a firm  or household is pulled out of trouble once, exceptionally, that 
is still not softness of the budget constraint. SBC appears, and only appears, where the rescuee 
organization expects to be rescued from trouble. It counts on a bailout because it can draw that 
conclusion from earlier instances, for example, where others in trouble have been frequently bailed out. 
That expectation appears not only subconsciously, but as a factor in decision-making and activity that 
affects its behavior. 
 For a moment let us leave open how strongly it expects rescue and whether the expectation rests 
on a correct diagnosis. Let us also leave open the kind of influence exerted on behavior. And let us 
ignore, of course, whether the rescue is right or wrong. The concept is being clarified: whether or not 
there is expectation and whether or not it affects behavior. 
 To sum up, the SBC syndrome is more than a financial phenomenon. It concerns a social 
relation between organizations linked interactively, between an applicant for rescue and a provider of 
it. The two parties are unequal: the applicant is at the mercy of the provider; the former is weaker, the 
latter stronger; the former is in a lower, the latter in a higher position. There is a vertical, not a 
horizontal relation between them. In the sense that the latter is the predominant force, this is not strictly 
speaking an economic relation, but one of power and subordination, where a lasting behavioral pattern 
emerges between them. The behavior on each side is governed by specific motivations, but that leads 
on to the causal analysis. 
 
Causal analysis 
I am unsatisfied by a simple statement that the interacting parties each maximize their utility. That is an 
empty statement. Their motivations must be grasped more specifically. 
 Let us first examine the driving forces acting in the first phase, before the financial trouble 
ensues. 
 Let us begin by examining the organization applying for rescue. Notice that seven of the eight 
organization types listed are not profit-oriented. The motivations of each would need to be discussed 
singly, as they are complex, not reducible to one force. Without aiming at completeness, let me pick out 
the motives of some types of organization of particular interest to the subject here. 
o Households want to spend more, gain better living conditions. If they were hitherto poor, living 
in cramped homes, they want acceptable dwellings and to buy a first car. Their haste is psychologically 
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understandable: they want access to these goods soon. Having reached reasonable prosperity, they 
strive to step ahead. To compound this is a kind of spending passion in some. While economic 
conditions look sound and households gain quite easy access to credit, they fail to sense their budget 
constraint and their spending speeds on. The more the economy thrives, the greater the spending drive 
becomes. 
o NGOs, LGOs distinct within the apparatus of state, budgetary institutions for special purposes, 
or projects not tied to a specific for-profit enterprise: all would like to expand their activity. Hospitals 
will want better equipment and new patient accommodation, fire and ambulance services ever better 
vehicles, settlements new public buildings, kindergartens, and schools, the armed forces more and 
better planes, observation facilities, warships, and tanks, welfare foundations more support for their 
beneficiaries, and so on. Their identification with their tasks provides sufficient inducement for this 
propensity to spend and expand. 
o Governing political forces would like budgetary funds to increase their popularity (and where 
elections play a role, their vote). Every high official in the apparatus of state works to gain more 
spending money for the activity under his or her authority (Desai and Olofsgård 2006, Kaiser and 
Taugourdeau 2013). 
 I call the common feature in these psychologically defined motivations the expansion drive. It 
stimulates growth in spending and stops only where it meets a constraint. The buffer may be 
conservative bank lending, legislative limits on spending, or state controls. In some cases caution acts 
as a limit or sober appreciation of the risks of overspending. But the drive to spend, the expansion, 
investment hunger, “fiscal alcoholism”4 – these are instinctive, natural traits well explainable 
psychologically. What stands up to them as a constraint is an artificial formation. The expansion drive 
comes from within, the expansion constraint from the outside. 
 I have left profit-oriented firms to last. If a firm had a single motive – maximization of long-
term profit – it can be seen logically that it would limit its spending of its own accord.5 But trade 
fluctuation in the business sphere belies that convincingly as too simplistic a theory of motivation. 
When things go well in the economic environment, the drive to expand wins in profit-oriented firms 
too. That in turn is stimulated by rivalry: one firm feels it can keep its place only by growing. If a firm 
fails to grow it lags behind. It is easy to obtain credit in such an environment because banks want to 
grow as well. In many firms expenditures grow in relation to earnings: the easy availability of credit 
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leads to a rapid rise in investment. And so it goes on, until the growth spurt meets one of the constraints 
on expansion. 
 This introduction is not intended to analyze the processes in macroeconomic terms, only to 
show the motivation: the clear inducements for some organizations sooner or later lead to 
overspending, to court trouble that leads ultimately to calling for a bail-out.6  
 Let us turn to the phase where the trouble is imminent or has occurred. 
 The motive of organizations seeking rescue is largely self-evident. The driving force is simply 
an effort to survive, an urge so strong it can often vanquish all others. If households cannot meet their 
financial obligations, they may face elemental problems of survival. Non-profit organizations of 
various kinds strive to fulfill the tasks for which they were created, if only at a lower level. Central 
government on a national scale seeks to perform the usual state functions; the political lives of those in 
government may depend on averting financial failure. Often profit-oriented firms have so strong an 
urge to survive at all cost that it overrides the course that a strictly profit-maximizing calculation would 
dictate: liquidation of the firm. 
 The will to survive is a sufficient motive for some bodies in trouble to apply for help. 
 The next thing to consider are the motives of organizations providing support. It is no good 
looking for just one. The motivation depends, on the one hand, on the rescuer/rescuee relation: what 
particular applicant is making a call upon what particular supportive body. Populist politicians and 
charitable foundations have different motives for helping households in trouble. Furthermore, there 
may be several motives at work on a rescuing body within a particular relation, concurrently or in 
conjunction. Let us take some of them. 
o A lender such as a bank is “after its money.” The amounts spent on the borrower so far count as 
sunk costs: it would be sad to let them go. In business language, there is “too much invested to quit.” It 
still seems preferable to refinance and continue the investment funded by the loan than to halt it and 
lose all the expenditures entirely.7  
o In some cases central government, LGOs, and some weighty business organizations may be 
inclined to bail out organizations in trouble to prevent spill-over effects of an economic micro-crisis 
occurring. If one firm fails to pay its suppliers, they may be unable to pay theirs, and so on, in a chain 
of unpaid debts. The further this goes, the greater the threat of a macro-crisis. Bailing out key insolvent 
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7 This case is analyzed in a pioneer study by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), whose underlying ideas have been adopted 
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debtors may avert this. 
o There may be moral inducements to rescue: social solidarity, sincere compassion. Many do not 
want to stand idly by while those behind on their mortgage payments have their homes auctioned over 
their heads, or a failed firm sacks its employees. Such noble feelings dwell in many political decision-
makers, or if the feelings are too weak, they may be pushed into a rescue by protest movements or 
taunts from political rivals (Becker 1983). 
o Mass occurrence of micro-crises may escalate into social tensions that lose governing  forces 
popularity. Politicians may be driven to a bail-out by the motive of political survival, or under a 
democratically operating political structure, maximization of electoral support. 
o Some rescuees (say a firm with a well-known brand, an excellent theater, or a famous museum) 
may have a nimbus they can call on when applying for help. 
o The hidden aim of a rescuing organization may be to gain supporters in business or the arts – 
build up patron/client ties of a political nature (Robinson and Torvik 2009). Repetition of this 
trouble/rescue scenario may reinforce the power relation between them. 
o Rescuers may be motivated by their own financial interest: the applicant for rescue has bribed 
the decision-maker or his or her adviser, the person preparing the decisions. Even if there has been no 
corruption in a crudely lawbreaking sense, the decision-maker may be influenced by personal ties: 
applications may have come from friends, old school or university fellows, fellow club members, or 
like-minded people from the same political party. 
 There exist many other motives, but these examples suffice to show it is incorrect to ascribe to a 
single motive willingness to subsidize organizations in trouble. 
 There remains a psychological factor to examine: how does the expectation of rescue develop? 
There is no simple, generally valid answer to the question. The rescuees’ decision-makers have learned 
from experience, not necessarily their own, but from observing bailouts being made to other 
organizations. If others are bailed out, they can expect the same. Or the rescuees’ decision-makers may 
work out a hypothesis what the potential rescuers’ interests or motivation may be: “Ours is the only 
large company in town. It would damage the reputation of the mayor if it was allowed to go bust.” 
 Expectations can be sober and realistic or mistaken. Perhaps rescuees assess wrongly what 
potential rescuers are willing to do. But wrong expectations may also shape behavior. 
 The logics of the explanation is this. The behavior of organizations concerned (rescuees and 
rescuers) is explained by their inclinations, both in the first phase, before trouble occurs, and in the 
second phase, when application for and decision on the rescue are formed. Inclinations and ultimately 
the behavior are shaped by their motivations and the social psychological situation that emerges. Given 
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the concurrence of the conditions, the phenomenon has to occur. It is another matter that neither the 
frequency of occurrence nor the intensity and strength of it are preordained. 
 
Effects 
The favorable effects of a specific bailout may outweigh the unfavorable ones. This will be treated in 
the subsequent section on therapy. The SBC syndrome, however, I judge to be an unhealthy 
phenomenon. 
1. The SBC syndrome encourages wanton spending. There is no need to fear grave financial 
troubles much as they will not become matters of life or death. The bailouts will ensure that we survive 
them. The wantonness appears in many different forms: 
o Market demand gets out of control, even though some of it is not actually covered by available 
funds (see Chapter 4 of this volume: the 1983 study written with Jörgen Weibull, entitled “Paternalism, 
buyers’ market, sellers’ market” and these articles: Goldfeld and Quandt 1988, 1990, and 1993; Magee 
and Quandt 1994; Pun 1995; and Quandt 2000). Demand “runs away.”8 
o Decision-makers embark on irresponsible investments. They fail to gauge risks or the possible 
loss-making consequences with due care. They feel they are covered: the rescuing organization will 
play the role of insurer. This is primarily what is meant by the expression “moral risk” applied in 
standard economics. 
2. The SBC syndrome reduces the price and cost sensitivity of decision-makers. Those fairly sure 
of rescue from big trouble have no inducement to penny-pinch or make small savings because the 
rescuer will cover excess expenditure an order of magnitude greater. 
3. The SBC syndrome alters the outlook of managers of bodies applying for rescue or subsidies 
and their allocation of attention and activity. They devote less attention and energy to improving their 
original function (for instance, the attention a production firm pays to raising quality, reducing costs, 
marketing, and so on.) Meanwhile they give more heed and energy to fostering relations with potential 
rescuers and to gaining patrons and serving them faithfully. 
 These three effects together reduce the efficiency of the organization. 
4. The SBC syndrome also damages the morals of society. The deep financial trouble I referred to 
earlier is linked in every case to failure to meet obligations previously agreed, and breaches of contract 
and other commitments. What this usually means is that debtors fail to pay creditors, suppliers, or their 
own employees. The SBC-syndrome tends to urge decision-makers to breach their contracts, not to pay 
for the goods or service, not to pay their debt.  They will muddle through somehow; somebody else will 
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pay instead of them, they think. (See the article “Breaking Promises,” written in 2013 and reprinted 
here as Chapter 13.) 
 The SBC outlook inspires a process of redistribution that many find unfair or dishonest. That 
was the reaction to bureaucratic redistribution of profits among state-owned enterprises under the 
socialist system. (See Chapter 3 of this volume, which republishes a 1983 study co-authored with 
Ágnes Matits: “Softness of the Budget Constraint – An Analysis Relying on Data of Firms.”) The same 
indignation is repeatedly felt at unjustified profit redistributions under the capitalist system, and 
comparable feelings arose over the debt moratoria awarded to spendthrift LGOs in Hungary in 2011–
2013, covered and analyzed in the Appendix to this Introduction. Let me recall here two newspaper 
headlines reporting on reactions from communities not covered by these exceptional bailouts: “Heads 
of 22 non-indebted cities bang heads against the wall” (Éber 2014) and “Better performers punished” 
(Sóvágó 2013). The thrifty and upright do badly, the wasteful and feckless do well – this is a 
conclusion that is harming the well-being of society. 
 
Some qualifications 
So far some simplifications have been made for clarity’s sake. It is now time to express things more 
precisely. 
 The words “soft” and “hard” have been used in my explanations, whereas in fact that there are 
degrees of softness and hardness. However strongly the SBC syndrome applies, organizations cannot 
be utterly certain of rescue. The potential subsidizing body may act inconsistently. So no perfectly soft 
budget constraint pertains in this sense. This recognition, however, may prompt the applicant for rescue 
to put more effort still into currying favor with the organization that could save it. 
 The degrees of softness or hardness are expressing ultimately the security of the expectations of 
organizations for rescue or support; what is the subjective probability of being rescued if they meet 
trouble? It is hard to say how such subjective probabilities can be observed and measured in practice. 
One approach is a questionnaire (Anderson, Korsun and Murell 2000). Another approach is to derive 
from the econometric analysis of objectively observed and measured variables certain proxy variables 
which quantify the likelihood of rescue (Pettersson and Lidbom 2010, Tjerbo and Hagen 2009). 
 It emerges from the earlier discussion how many variants there are of the relationship between 
the applicant for rescue or support and the organization providing it, in how many forms the SBC 
syndrome appears, and how severe the syndrome is, depending on the specific circumstances of its 
appearance. The SBC syndrome is a heterogeneous set of phenomena. So it is wise to refrain from 
excessively general statements about it, for example, from stating simply that the budget constraint is 
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soft under socialism or hard under capitalism. This proviso leads on to the next subject. 
 
Situation report on the prevalence of the SBC 
 
When (at what stage in history), where (under what system, in what sector, in what sphere), and how 
strong and serious is the SBC syndrome? It would be good if these questions could be answered on a 
basis of detailed surveys, but unluckily I only have impressions to fall back on, gained from my own 
researches and examining the literature on the subject. I have sought these impressions not only from 
works that apply the apparatus of SBC theory, but from those where the key expression in describing 
the problem is “moral risk.” 
 
The socialist system: the pre-reform period 
There were 26 socialist countries in existence in 1988. A table of these appears in my 1992 book The 
Socialist System on pages 7–8.. Now, two decades later, as I work on this paper, the number has sunk to 
two. Only North Korea and Cuba count unreservedly as socialist countries by the criteria then 
employed. The questions put at the beginning of the section apply, in relation to the socialist countries, 
in the past, not the present. Yet they are still worth raising, not least because it was experience under the 
socialist system that led to recognition of the SBC phenomenon: there it took an extreme form that 
made it more noticeable. Furthermore, the SBC syndrome under socialism provides a marked basis of 
comparison for studying the related phenomena apparent under capitalism. 
 I have singled out in my works two operative phases or prototypes of the socialist system: 
classical socialism and various moves from it; in other words, I distinguished  the Stalinist model from 
post-Stalinist reform socialism. 
 The budget constraint was obviously soft for state-owned firms under the classical socialist 
system. Enterprise inputs and outputs were expressed in money and official political textbooks declared 
that income had to cover expenditure. This was known as the principle of autonomous cost accounting, 
often known by the Russian term khozraschot (Joffe 1949). So there existed a budget constraint on 
paper; among the enterprise’s compulsory plan figures was one for profit as well. But enterprise chiefs 
were not mobilized to fulfill that target and they were given no strong material or moral incentives to 
do so. (See Kornai: Overcentralization in Economic Administration, 1959 [1957].) Whether profitable 
or loss-making, this did not affect an enterprise’s subsequent operation or development. Losses were 
either covered automatically, or its administratively controlled prices would be adjusted from time to 
time to its costs. What was demanded above all from existing enterprises was fulfillment of its 
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production plan. Investment decisions prescribed firstly what capacity was to be created and when 
production was to begin; expected profitability did not play any essential role. There was of course a 
cost target, but exceeding it was ignored.  What was punished was late completion of the new facility. 
If the investment proved loss-making in the narrow, book-keeping sense, for example because the costs 
had not been spared to complete it in time, the loss would be covered in some form. 
 Decisions on funding central government, LGOs (councils in Hungary, soviets in the Soviet 
Union), or any other agency of the state were taken by the superior body in charge of the organization, 
and the enforcement of financial discipline was in the hands of that. The various non-state 
organizations (trade unions, professional bodies, associations for the young and for women, etc.) acted 
as transmission mechanisms for the party-state. Their existence rested solely on whether party-state 
leaders wished to operate them and how much they were willing to spend. No idea ever arose of 
slimming or ending the operation of such a “social” organization because there was no money to pay 
for it. 
 All this, to use the parlance of the SBC, meant the budget constraint was extremely soft 
throughout the state and semi-state sphere. 
 In reality the one type of organization whose budget constraint was hard, in fact very hard 
indeed, were households. Apart from some insignificant, sporadic exceptions, there did not exist any 
bank or commercial credit for households under the classical socialist system.9 There were no credit 
cards. Consumers paid up front in cash. Even if they had wanted to, they could not overspend or fall 
into debt. 
 
The socialist system: the reform period 
Some socialist countries – Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland being among the first – brought in reforms 
that enhanced the role played by market coordination. The reforming countries in many respects 
differed from each other, in their moves away from the old economic order and in timing of them. But 
they had a common feature: each sought to create a combination of the centrally controlled economic 
system with a decentralized market economy. 
 The various alterations were intended to produce an economic system that gave greater 
autonomy to state-owned enterprises, and coupled financial incentives for their managers −and  to 
                                                   
9 There were two credit schemes in reverse, whereby citizens lent to the state. One was a strange way of buying state 
bonds. Citizens in a market economy may buy state bonds voluntarily, but under the socialist system, strong pressure 
could be applied on them to subscribe. The other reverse form of credit evolved out of the sale of private cars. Buyers 
waited years for their order to be fulfilled, but all or part of the purchase price had to be paid in advance. In other words, 
citizens seeking to buy a car were lending money to the state vehicle trade. 
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some extent also enterprise development – to profitability instead of fulfillment of central planning 
commands. Under those conditions the question whether firms made a profit or a loss became relevant 
again. And if they made a loss, what were the consequences? To a greater or lesser extent in the reform 
socialist countries, bank credit to enterprises began to play a separate part. But that posed a dilemma: 
what if a firm cannot repay its loan? 
 These circumstances (new and unfamiliar to managers socialized in a classical socialist 
economy) turned the softness or hardness of the budget constraint into a relevant problem. But the 
experiences were disillusioning. Despite the partial or total dismantling of the system of planning 
commands and the fundamental changes in the coordination mechanisms of the economy, the budget 
constraint remained soft. Special significance is attached here to the experiences in Hungary, where the 
reduction in centralized economic planning and increase in the role of the market went furthest. But not 
even that was enough to harden the budget constraint. (See my 1986 study “The Hungarian reform 
process: visions, hopes and reality” and my 1992 study “Market socialism revisited".) Poland and 
Yugoslavia had similar experiences in the period of socialist economic reform. But a  radically different 
situation emerged in the small-scale private sector, which began to expand at this time. For these small 
economic units the budget constraint was hard from the outset and remained so.10  
 Let us turn back from a historical distance to the socialist system and to its two prototypes: 
classical and reform socialism. Decades later I still consider correct a statement made in my 1980 book 
Economics of Shortage (republished in 2011): the budget constraint on state-owned enterprises was soft 
not only under classical socialism, but under the economy of somewhat reformed “market” socialism as 
well. 
 However, there are two essential matters on which my position has changed since then. 
1. The role of the SBC explaining the shortage economy. The first chapter of this volume, 
containing a study of mine published as early as in 1978, sums up the view I held when writing 
Economics of Shortage. I then stated that several factors had to coincide for an economy to become one 
of chronic, general shortage. Of these I viewed the soft budget constraint as the prime mover, the most 
important factor. Without a hard budget constraint to curb expansion drive and its most important 
manifestation, investment hunger, the demand for investment goods will be insatiable. Though the 
budget constraint on the household sector may be hard, which places a limitation on demand from 
households, there are many leakages between the markets of investment, production and consumer 
                                                   
10 Consumer credit also appeared in the reform socialist economy, primarily in the form of mortgages to build private 
apartments and family homes. Usually, repayment of these was strictly enforced; it did not lead to an appreciable 
softening of the hard budget constraint. 
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goods. If investment demand “runs away,” this has the effect of drawing supply off from all markets. 
 My later, revised position retains that assertion: the effect of these factors are a necessary 
condition for a general, chronic shortage economy to develop. But to this must be added a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition. Other conditions must also be met. 
 A notable international debate arose on this question. Of the critics of my position, let me single 
out the economist of Polish origin then teaching in England, Stanisław Gomułka. For his article, which 
originally appeared in English, see Gomulka 1985. I replied to this in 1987 and that piece is reprinted 
as Chapter 6 of this volume.  
 In correcting my view in Economics of Shortage and in replying to Gomułka’s article, still in 
the socialist period, I was paralyzed by the need to exercise self-censorship. I did not even try to point 
out the most important factor: that the socialist system will not tolerate private entrepreneurs entering 
freely into production or any broad evolution of an enterprise sector based on private ownership. Nor 
did I mention (or rather I thought I could not mention) that the decisive role in eliminating shortage 
would be played by a free influx of import products. 
 The debates certainly had an influence on me. More cogent, however, was the influence of the 
changes I saw happening around me and theoretical rethinking of those experiences. There had been a 
growth of legal or at least tolerated or concealed private economic activity in the Hungarian reform 
socialist period of the 1970s and still more the 1980s. (Let me note here the household farming in 
agriculture, the auxiliary sideline activities of collective farms, and the various forms of maszek 
(private sector) activity.) This sector burst forth in that period, at free prices, contributing an 
appreciable proportion of the supply of foodstuffs and personal services. It could fill the gaps that the 
state-owned firms, the cooperatives, and the state-controlled imports could not fill. That explained why 
the shortage economy ceased in those sectors, notably in food supplies, while it remained in other areas 
of the economy. 
 I advanced my reconsidered position in my article “Eliminating the shortage economy” (1995), 
whose 1994 Hungarian version reappears as Chapter 8 in this volume. By then all barriers to free 
speech had fallen. I summed up all the necessary – and sufficient – conditions for a chronic shortage 
economy. Remove those and general shortage was bound to cease (although the possibility of chronic 
shortage subsisting in some sectors was not excluded). It is enough for readers, while studying the 
Introduction, to glance at Figure 3 of the article. Now the soft budget constraint on enterprises appears 
not as prime mover, but as one of the explanatory factors, where it belongs. It is a most important 
intermediate explanatory factor, and its correct place is in the second bloc of the complex chain of 
causality. 
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 I established that even if softness of the budget constraint remained in the state enterprise 
sector, chronic, intensive shortage would cease where private firms were permitted to enter. They could 
cover amply the demand that the state sector could not meet. 
 This line of thought is exemplified by the Chinese economy.11 There is still a sizeable state-
owned enterprise sector where the SBC syndrome applies as ever (Wu 2002 and 2005, Xu 2011, Zhang 
and Freestone 2013). Yet there is now no general, chronic shortage as the market is flooded with goods 
and services from private firms, and imports also appear (though often curbed). Most goods and 
services appear freely on the market; only a minority of prices are controlled by the state. 
2. Relative weight of the effects of the SBC syndrome. The idea of softness and hardness of the 
budget constraint occurred to me in seeking the causes of chronic shortage. I knew from the outset – 
and said so in my works – that the SBC syndrome damages efficiency.  But I focused on the 
[SBC → shortage] link and the [SBC → efficiency loss] link was downgraded. 
 Already then, at the very beginning I was stating that the SBC phenomenon could occur also 
under the capitalist system. The more I dealt with it, the more aware I became of the 
[SBC → efficiency loss] connection. I have now believed for a long time that its harmful effect on the 
efficiency of the economy is the prime reason for paying attention to the SBC syndrome. 
 
The capitalist system: sectors exposed to the SBC syndrome 
The SBC syndrome exerts itself (with varying force) in several spheres of the capitalist system. It 
appears not only occasionally due to a random constellation of conditions, but certain combinations of 
institutions and behavioral patterns occur regularly, and these generate in most cases (although not in 
all cases) the SBC syndrome. Yet other parts of the system are largely free of the syndrome – immune 
to this pathological deformation.  
 I can list nine territories susceptible to the SBC syndrome. 
1.  Firms in state ownership. Let me refer here to Hungarian experience. It is noted repeatedly that 
Budapest Transport (BKV) and Hungarian State Railways (MÁV) make big losses. Clearly the 
officially controlled prices for public transport are set at levels where ticket revenue fails to cover 
running costs, let alone expenditures for development. How should the burden be split between 
passengers and central and local government? It is not my task to give a detailed specific answer; there 
is a big literature on the matter. It calls for a robust solution needing little amendment as time goes by. 
                                                   
11 The Chinese economy will be mentioned again. It is not possible to apply to China periodization in which 1989–90 is 
taken as a sharp divide between the reform process within the socialist system and  post-socialist transformation. There 
the system underwent gradual change, so that they almost merged into each other. 
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Instead there is continual bargaining, with successive protests, threats, pleadings, and promises kept or 
broken. The state-owned enterprise has its debts partly or wholly paid and it all starts again. Such 
events are obvious symptoms of the SBC syndrome. Ultimately, enterprises can rightly expect things 
not to deteriorate to a point where the trams, buses and trains cease running for a long time. So there is 
good reason to wait for a bailout. 
 State-owned enterprises in many other countries are in a similar position. 
2. Local and regional government organizations. Such bodies struggle in many countries with 
long-term deficits, unpaid bills, accumulated debts, and insolvency. In many, though not all countries 
“consolidation” ensues and troubled LGOs are rescued. There is a wide literature on this manifestation 
of the SBC syndrome (Qian and Roland 1998, Rodden, Eskeland, and Litwack 2003, Fink and 
Stratmann 2011, Baskaran 2012, Padovano 2013, Josselin, Padovano, and Rocaboy 2013, Dietrichson 
and Ellegård 2013). Hungary is a notably conspicuous case (Vasvári, 2013). The Appendix to this 
introduction gives data on how the surge of LGO indebtedness took place and how central government 
bailed them out again in 2011-2013. The Hungarian story is a classic example vying for a place in 
textbooks on the SBC syndrome. 
3. Budget-funded institutions and non-governmental organizations. Here can be placed 
organizations with hybrid ownership that share features of budgetary institutions and of enterprises.12 In 
terms of financial aims they are usually said to operate on the “non-profit” principle. Into Type 3 can be 
placed most hospitals, outpatient facilities, museums, arts centers, and non-commercial theaters and 
opera houses.13 The “non-profit” character itself means that costs will not be fully covered by revenues 
generated by selling their services to users. These organizations are dependent on subsidies from 
central or local government. So a situation emerges similar to the one described in Type 1 (state-owned 
enterprises): they repeatedly reach the brink of financial catastrophe and appeal for help, and quite 
often receive it. To an extent they come to expect such assistance and are usually not disappointed.14 
4. Banks. Economists analyzing crises have shown through cold facts of economic history the 
sequence of the following events. If a bank on the brink of collapse was not rescued, panic breaks out 
among depositors and other creditors fearful of not retrieving their money can. That is leading to the  
                                                   
12 Vahabi (2011) introduced the notion of a “parastatal” sector. In Vahabi's conceptual framework two quite unusual 
institutions created by the US federal government, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac belong to the parastatal sector. Their 
purpose is to assist or rescue those defaulting on mortgage payments. Here too the SBC syndrome appears. 
13 The SBC syndrome in the health service is the subject of my paper “The Soft Budget Constraint Syndrome in the 
Hospital Sector” (2009), which forms Chapter 9 of this volume. It is discussed by several other authors:  Bordignon and 
Turati 2009, Tjerbo and Hagen 2009, Crivelli, Leive and Stratmann 2010, Brekke, Siciliani and Straume 2012. 
Eggleston and Shen 2011 show that insistence on a hard budget constraint and associated cost trimming may erode 
quality. 
14 The Hungarian government has eagerly expanded the non-profit sector in recent years, primarily in public utilities, but 
elsewhere too. This forebodes further growth of the sphere where the budget constraint is soft. 
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insolvency of the bank, which in turn has a knock-on effect among other financial institutions, and 
ultimately the whole economy. This happened in 1929–32 at the start of the Great Depression, and 
likewise, the most recent financial crisis was instigated by the failure of Lehman Brothers on 15 
September 2008. It has often been possible to avert a crisis if the country’s financial administration or 
the banking sector itself bails out the collapsing bank; sometimes foreign banks or international 
organizations also contribute to such rescues. “Too big to fail” is the wisdom heard in US business 
circles about the major banks. The practice has become so widespread (the Lehman Brothers’ case was 
exceptional in this respect) that banks now count quite consciously on such rescues (Buiter 2009, Gros 
2012, Stern and Feldman 2004, Khwaja and Mian 2005). This is a typical example of the SBC 
syndrome in action. 
5. Indispensable private firms. What are meant here primarily are vast businesses that employ tens 
of thousands (such as large vehicle or aircraft factories). Here also the “too big to fail” argument is 
heard: if they went bust it would generate waves of unemployment and leave large numbers of unpaid 
suppliers insolvent as well. Such vast firms put extreme pressure on the state to save them from trouble. 
Similarly strong is the bargaining position of private firms that may not be vast, but enjoy a natural 
monopoly (Segal 1998). Despite private ownership, susceptibility to the SBC symptom appears 
wherever a firm feels itself indispensable.  
 The table in my 2009 study (chapter 12 in this volume,) “The soft budget constraint syndrome 
and the global financial crisis” gives a long list of major, widely noticed Types 4 and 5 bailouts 
undertaken in the most developed countries of the world. Reports about these episodes certainly 
contributed to a worldwide expansion of the SBC symptom.  
 Hungary has frequent cases of troubled sports clubs (which are openly or implicitly 
commercial, privately owned organizations) seeking and receiving state bailouts. I must admit I had 
thought this was a Hungarian peculiarity, but I recently read a study entitled “Soft budget constraints in 
professional football” (Storm and Nielsen 2012), where it emerged that many truly profit-oriented, 
privately owned sports clubs in Europe regularly receive state subsidies to cover trading losses, and 
fully expect them. World-famous clubs realize that their collapse would mean a huge loss of prestige to 
football fans in their city, county, or country. This gives them a strong bargaining position. (See also 
Andreff 2011 and Storm 2012.) 
6. Large, priority projects funded with public money. In some cases both state and privately owned 
firms participate, in others the contract goes to private companies alone. Two typical examples are the 
supersonic airliner Concorde and the Channel Tunnel between England and France. Numerous large 
military orders and infrastructural developments could be added. There is a close affinity to Type 5, of 
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which Type 6 might be seen as a sub-type. The common denominator is that there is no one enterprise 
in charge, and some state body keeps control of the project directly. So the distinction between public 
and private monies can be blurred. Often it is an understatement to use the epithet large, for giant sums 
are spent and there is great public attention paid to the project, unless it is a secret military one. The 
situation is a hotbed of the SBC syndrome. There is no stopping such a project whatever the excess 
expenditure. Wikipedia’s “Cost overrun” page lists 37 notable, or more precisely, notorious giant 
projects. Others besides the two mentioned include the Olympic stadia built in Sydney and Montreal, 
the Scottish Parliament building, the two Airbus airliner types, and the Boston “big dig” tunnel system. 
Concorde cost twelve times, the Sydney opera house 15 times more than the original estimates. The 
latest case is the Sochi Winter Olympics, which cost $51 billion instead of the planned $12 billion: 
more than the aggregate spent on all Winter Olympics so far. On a more modest Hungarian scale, there 
belong here Budapest’s Metro 4 subway line and the CET business center on the Pest side of the 
Danube. 
7. Firms and individual producers benefiting from sectoral support. These may be granted under  
the pressure of  industrial, commercial , or territorial interest groups, lobbies or political forces. A 
typical example is the raft of subsidies given to agricultural producers from the European Union 
(Rizov, Pokrivcak, and Ciaian, 2012). Reductions or cessations of such support are hampered by 
repeated political battles and protest actions. The subject remains one of constant debate and 
bargaining. The invariable argument in favor is that worthy rural families would otherwise go bust. The 
history of agricultural subsidies in America and Europe demonstrates well the difficulty of combating 
the SBC. 
8. Private firms rescued through corruption. Under Type 7 were listed subsidies that are lawful 
and in line with ethical norms (though they may be of debatable use). Type 8 consists of unethical cases 
that often break the law, openly or secretly. If a private firm is in trouble and ignored, it will become 
insolvent. But it may be saved if it receives some form of support from a state body (by lowering its tax 
bill, raising the price paid for a state order of procurement, etc.) All it requires is a bribe to the one 
preparing or making the decision on the matter. The greater the chance of corruption succeeding, the 
softer the budget constraint becomes. 
 I have separated Types 7 and 8 to make the theoretical classification unequivocal. In practice the 
boundary between them is often blurred. 
9. Central government. For centuries central governments have found themselves in financial 
trouble from time to time. The trouble can take several forms. The ultimate is a payments problem: 
reserves run out and revenue fails to cover the outgoings. More common is a debt crisis: interest and 
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capital repayments due cannot be met, and access to new loans is lost. The catastrophe may not have 
occurred yet, but the danger is apparent and the sources of credit dry up. Such crises are analyzed over 
a long period of history in a significant and rightfully celebrated work by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
The book examines thoroughly the events of the last two centuries, taking each economic crisis 
occurring in that period in the 66 countries that accounted for the bulk of world GDP. Of the crises 
described, 320 can be said to have grown from a grave fiscal situation in the central government of 
some country, while 250 were mainly concerned with foreign debt, and 70 with domestic debt.15 In an 
overwhelming proportion of cases the country gets over the catastrophe; with few exceptions states do 
not disappear off the map as a result of fiscal troubles. Among the alternative solutions are bailouts on a 
national level. The rescue is performed by the central government of another country, by an ad hoc 
consortium of central governments of several countries, or the central agency of a supranational 
regional integration, or an international agency such as the IMF. (Of the ample literature on the fiscal 
catastrophes, handling of state indebtedness, and countries under threat of insolvency connected with 
the latest international crisis, including the political implications of these, let me single out Győrffy 
2013, Boone and Johnson 2010, and Baskaran and Hessami 2013.) 
 Such a disaster and recovery cause suffering to the country’s inhabitants; those in power at the 
time usually pay a high political price. Yet that does not leave government politicians immune to the 
lures of excessive budget spending or improvident debt. Fears from financial rigor are weakened by the 
expectation: after all, some kind of rescue will appear in a case of deep trouble. I do not claim all 
governments facing such problems exceed their budgets or incur unlimited debt because they are 
certain of a bailout, but it is in the back of their minds that the chances of rescue are not unrealistic. 
One thought, in democracies where governments often change, may be: who knows who will be in 
power when the loan that saves the day has to be repaid? So the SBC syndrome demonstrably exists 
also among central  governments, with an intensity that varies by country and political cycle.16 
 The survey so far has touched on nine areas where the SBC syndrome lives and operates within 
the capitalist system. Let us postpone analyzing individuals, the population, the household sector, and 
compare the following type with the nine examined so far. 
10. Firms and individual producers excluded from bailouts. Here can be placed the small family 
                                                   
15 The account was drawn up by Ágnes Vidovics-Dancs, defining external debts as credit instruments incurred within a 
foreign jurisdiction, and domestic debts as those incurred within the country’s own jurisdiction. To give an idea of the 
relative size of the numbers, it can be added that a bank crisis was the starting point in around 360 cases, whereas the 
main role was played by fiscal troubles in about 320 cases. 
16 SBC problems linked with financing aid programs form a particular subtype. In most, but not all, cases the aid to a 
country after a natural disaster, civil war, or famine is distributed through its government, which is why I mention it here 
(Svensson 2000 and Janus 2009). 
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businesses, individual producers, and small and medium-sized firms (with some exceptions covered 
under Point 7). Indeed most large corporations in severe financial trouble do not receive or expect 
bailouts either. (Point 5 covers some exceptions.) 
 My statement is backed indirectly by the “demography” of entries and exits of firms. The 
annual proportion of all small firms ceasing to trade in Hungary between 2000 and 2010 ranged from 2 
to 6 percent, and among medium-sized firms within a lower range of 0.8 and 3.5 percent. Figures for 
the time series after 2010 are unavailable, but it can be established from another source that between 
2008 and the first half of 2013, from the 500,000–600,000 firms 10,000–18,000 firms ceased to trade 
per half year.17 Both statistics show a sizable “mortality” rate.18  
 I will risk drawing some conclusions from the demographic data for firms. Almost all firms on 
the brink of failure spend some time there, trying to keep going, then give up the struggle. Their expiry 
means they were left alone, not pulled out of the financial mire. This was the general outcome over 
many years, and there did not develop an expectation of rescue from trouble. So I dare to state that the 
budget constraint was hard in this segment. 
 It would be good to express numerically the ratio between types 1–9 in aggregate and Type 10, 
i. e. between those subject to the SBC syndrome and those unaffected by it. This means agreeing on 
how to measure the extents of the two. There are two obvious possibilities. One is the number of those 
working in them, the other their contribution to GDP. Sadly nobody, to my knowledge, has made such 
calculations. The proportions in the 150–200 countries that feature in the international statistics vary 
widely, depending primarily on the state’s role in society. Relying on my intuition I would chance the 
following guesses. 
 Measuring the numbers employed under today’s capitalism, Type 10, the sphere facing a hard 
budget constraint, is larger in most countries (perhaps much larger) than Types 1–9 together, associable 
with the SBC. Looking at GDP contributions, the proportions may shift in favor of the Types 1–9 
sphere, but it is still unlikely that the majority of GDP derives from there. Nonetheless, the sphere 
suffering the SBC syndrome is very sizable. 
 The measure used here is problematic in many ways. Certainly the contribution of Type 4, the 
banks, to GDP measured customarily in added value, is small. This, though, reflects the proportion of 
costs to the human and physical capital tied down by them, not to the strength of their direct and 
                                                   
17 The two sources use different methods, so that their data are not directly comparable. It would seem (but cannot be 
proven because of the methodological problem) that the exit process by small and medium-sized firms speeded up after 
the crisis broke out. 
18 Entry and exit data for Hungarian firms were processed by Réka Branyiczki. Her detailed report with many more data 
and data sources appears on my website among the background materials for Volume IV www.kornai-
janos.hu/Kalligram4_hatter.html. 
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secondary effects. The same can be said of Type 5, the indispensable enterprises, and still more of Type 
9, central government. The key positions in the economy, the main seats of power, are in parts of the 
economy where the SBC syndrome has a marked effect. Thus it follows that it has a significant effect 
over the whole of the capitalist system. 
 Unfortunately, I can only build this line of thought on general ideas and intuitions about the 
situation in various sectors. Nobody has worked on numerical estimates for even one specific country. 
There is more about such research tasks at the end of this Introduction, but let me say here that this is 
one of the most important items in the program of future research. While I frankly reveal that all the 
above are based on conjecture, I still wish to make summarizing evaluations. Based on all I have come 
to know about capitalism in relation to the SBC, the contrast remains correct: the socialist system is 
marked by a soft budget constraint, the capitalist system by a hard one. Nonetheless, there are broad 
and influential sectors under capitalism that are strongly exposed to the SBC syndrome. 
 
The capitalist system: the household sector 
How can the SBC concept apply to households as a basic type of organization in the economy? Let us 
start with a narrower interpretation. It has been noted that households in the classical, pre-reform 
period of the socialist economy had no access to consumer credit: they had to meet their spending out 
of income and savings. To that extent their budget constraint was hard. On the other hand, consumer 
credit not only exists in a capitalist economy, it is very widespread. Loans, credit, installment plans, 
credit cards, and mortgage loans for housing are all normal constituents of household management. 
 It is quite common for households to be unable to service their consumer loans on time or to 
repay all their debts. If trouble strikes, attempts are made to renegotiate the credit terms. I would not 
class this customary refinancing procedure as a ”bailout”. I would reserve the expression in this context 
for actions where central government intervenes and obtains a reduction in the burdens on troubled 
households by non-regular means. This may be done with funds at its disposal. Such bailouts, 
ultimately at the taxpayers’ expense, may be augmented or replaced by the state compelling the lending 
banks legislatively to pay the bill. Such serial bailouts have been occurring in present-day Hungary in 
favor of indebted households that took out sizable housing mortgages denominated in foreign currency, 
lured by better interest terms, disregarding risks of exchange rate changes. This occurrence is explored 
in the article “Breaking Promises,” which appeared last year and anew as Chapter 13 in this volume. 
 Mass rescue of households may induce in the public an expectation of good chances of rescue 
for others in similar situations. It is early to say for sure whether this expectation has yet developed, 
and if so, how intensively and widely. Certainly the series of measures by the Hungarian government to 
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assist foreign-currency debtors has created conditions in which the SBC syndrome may develop in the 
household sector. 
 I do not have sufficiently wide information on what government programs exist in other 
countries to assist households failing to repay their mortgage loans or what effects they are having. 
Where there were appreciable rescue programs, these might bring about expectations of rescue as well, 
in other words, the SBC might appear in among households.19 
 Rescue of individuals and households can also bear a wider interpretation. Several symptoms of 
the SBC syndrome occur in non-market social insurance systems. It is possible to see as a type of 
rescue all benefits received by those harmed or in trouble that are not dispensed by a voluntary private 
insurance scheme in return for insurance premiums paid as a commercial, market transaction, but out of 
public funds, i.e. state resources. Here might be listed, for instance, unemployment benefit, or sick pay 
in case of accident or disease. By this line of argument, the sphere can be widened to include other 
services of the modern welfare state. If citizens arrange their lives so as to rely on a paternalist state and 
“bailout” aid from society, we encounter expectations that resemble the SBC syndrome in several 
respects.20  
 This touches on a problem that leads in several directions. It ties in with debates on the size and 
functions of the state, and on solidarity with those in trouble, need and poverty or suffering a 
disadvantage. It would exceed the bounds of this study to discuss these important matters in detail. I 
just wanted to show how far and how deeply the problems reach once one begins to meditate on the 
causes and effects of the SBC syndrome. 
 
The post-socialist transition 
Let us look first, from the angle of the SBC syndrome, at the transformation undergone after 1989–90 
in the area of the former Soviet Union and the East European socialist countries. Within a few years, at 
most a decade, radical changes in ownership relations took place at a speed very rapid in historical 
terms. The dominant property form beforehand was state ownership, afterwards private ownership. 
With that the hard budget constraint took over from the soft as the predominant situation in the 
economy as a whole. 
 Along with transformation of property relations came change in the legal system. Laws and 
                                                   
19 I have written these lines in the conditional because I know of no study to examine the budget constraint on households 
using the scientific apparatus and conceptual framework of the SBC theory. It would certainly be instructive to examine 
from this angle the long-term effects of the two American institutions to rescue mortgage debtors, mentioned earlier, 
Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac. 
20 For a theoretical approach using a mathematical model see Lindbeck and Weibull 1988, and Bergstrom 1989. 
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directives appeared that sought to enforce contracts and redefine legal relations between creditors and 
debtors. Hungary was the first country in the postsocialist region to adopt a strict bankruptcy law; this 
initiated a surge of failures in the economy. Laws and regulations on bankruptcy and liquidation were 
passed across the region, and applied in practice, not just on paper. The “mortality rate” among the 
region’s private firms is substantial.21 
 However, even after the postsocialist transition the SBC syndrome subsisted in the nine areas 
detailed above (Lizal and Svejnar 2002). Here let me underline the position of the publicly owned firms 
(Mykhayliv and Zauner 2013), in central government and LGO hands. Some stayed in state ownership 
over the transition; a few were privatized, then nationalized again, or founded by the state as its own 
property within the capitalist economy. The wider and stronger the publicly owned sector was, the more 
liable the economy became to the SBC syndrome. The peril has been described forcefully by Chinese 
economists pushing for market reforms (Chow, Song and Wong 2010, Wu 2002 and 2005, Xu 2011, Li 




The first two sections of the Introduction took a positive approach to examining the SBC syndrome, 
asking how the phenomenon appears in reality. Now let us turn to a normative approach. Since the 
syndrome persists, what can be done?  
 At the height of the last financial crisis, Larry Summers, Treasury secretary under President 
Clinton, wrote for the Financial Times a provocatively titled article: “Beware moral hazard 
fundamentalists” (Summers 2007). Let me say at the start of the normative discussion: I am no 
fundamentalist believer in hard budget constraint. Many think so, but wrongly. 
 Economists inspired by standard economics and bred on welfare economics would set about 
finding what the rule of optimal bailout is. What course contributes the maximum to society’s welfare? 
They would weigh carefully advantages and drawbacks, favorable and harmful effects, including 
delayed malign effects as well. They would establish, at least on a theoretical plane, when bailout was 
necessary and when forbidden. 
 Those familiar with my work will not be surprised when I say I cannot endorse this line of 
thinking. I am among those who say that no welfare function expressing “public interest” exists. 
Different values cannot be measured and confronted to each other by any magic trick of calculation. 
How many forints’ benefit is gained in saving a thousand families from eviction? Or on the other hand, 
                                                   
21 The statement reflects data given earlier on mass exits among Hungary’s small and medium-sized firms. 
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how many forints’ damage is done if a bank, believing in rescue and suffering under the SBC 
syndrome, lightly and irresponsibly provides housing loans not to one, but to many thousand families? 
I see such cost-benefit calculations as empty self-importance or eyewash. 
 I am convinced we cannot draw up any set of exact rules as to when a rescue is warranted and 
when not. Would-be rescuers must weigh all political, economic, social, and moral outcomes when 
deciding each bailout, or group bailout, if many demands for rescue are made at once. For my part I 
would erect a procedural requirement: careful preparation, feasibility and impact studies and 
consideration of their findings, and attention to all opinions from those affected. And whether these 
requirements are met or not, let those deciding do so on their own responsibility. 
 If asked for advice on a specific bailout, I would often approve it. Let me give one example. I 
would join those who see it as a catastrophic mistake to leave Lehman Brothers to its fate.22 The first 
big failure had a domino effect, with mass failures and catastrophic consequences in the United States 
and throughout the world. 
 It is an art to choose the bailout operations that are necessary on economic grounds or those of 
social solidarity, while striving also to minimize the appearance of SBC phenomena. The selection can 
never succeed perfectly. Inevitably SBC effects will occur to some extent.23 
 When a decision has to be made on a specific bailout, it is essential for the decision-maker to 
weight the following factors. The useful effect of the bailout appears immediately, but the harmful 
effect of frequent bailouts only after a long delay. The effect of a bailout is of a targeted, tangible 
nature, easily sensed; it brings marked feelings of relief to specified people. Employees are glad their 
jobs are saved; doctors and patients that the hospital stays open. The harmful “educational” effect of 
frequent bailouts, on the other hand, affect everybody, and lurk intangibly in people’s minds. Most 
bailouts are politically popular, so that populist politicians find them especially hard to resist. 
 Specific single bailouts may be desirable: each may help the organism of the economy to 
operate in a healthy way. But that statement is still compatible with the next: the SBC syndrome is a 
disease, which is one reason why I chose to call it a syndrome. The SBC syndrome is an innate, 
genetically coded disease of the spheres considered under points 1–9 in the previous section. We have 
to acknowledge and live with it. 
 Medicine and clinical practice do not idly observe a patient’s innate disease. They strive to 
                                                   
22 Of course anybody might add that it is easy to be wise after the event. 
23The lasting behavioral effects accompanying the favorable immediate ones are described concisely by noted researcher 
into behavioral economics who deals with the financial sphere, Werner de Bondt: „Many commentators give the 
government credit for its swift action. Soft budget constraints carry risk, however. The danger is that reckless spending 
becomes the norm; that entitlements replace responsibility; that subsidies replace efficiency; and that the political class, 
even more so than today, gets into the habit of picking economic winners and losers.” (de Bondt 2010, 146). 
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prevent it from getting worse. They reduce its harmful and painful effects as far as possible. I would 
advise economists and economic politicians to take the same approach to the SBC syndrome. Let us 
have no illusions: the problem cannot be wholly and finally cured. It will recur time and again. But that 
does not mean we have to stand idly by and watch its harmful effects. Its harmful tendencies can be 
restrained at every level with legal measures, for instance to encourage caution and more careful risk 
assessment by those deciding whether to extend credit (Feld et al. 2013). The scope for regulating the 
banking sector has by no means been exhausted. The bodies empowered to regulate intervene in 
financial processes if there are strong reasons for doing so. At the level of national fiscal decision-
making, there are notable experts who advocate upper limits on the budget deficit and indebtedness, 
codified in laws, or even embodied in the constitution (Kopits 2004).24  
One typical symptom of the SBC syndrome is bargaining between applicant for help and potential 
provider of it. Think here of the position of chronically loss-making state infrastructural enterprises 
(rail, public transport, utilities) and budget-funded institutions (hospitals, educational establishments). 
The state rescues them periodically before financial disaster sets in. Then it all starts over: an unending 
nexus of [consolidation → debt accumulation → consolidation → debt accumulation...]. Clearly these 
bodies cannot escape from the vicious circle under the present revenue structure (the state-controlled 
tariffs for their goods or services). It is often impossible to apply the obvious solution: to bring in prices 
that allow income to cover expenditures. The artificially low prices are justified on various economic 
and social grounds.25 In that situation, the problems might be greatly lessened if a well-grounded stable 
formula were used to set the state contribution to each organization’s costs. This would provide 
orientation for the enterprise or budgetary institution as to what it could expect without pleading for it. 
The procedure would not stamp out the SBC altogether. However much effort went into stabilizing the 
contribution formula, conditions  would change and changes would have to be made in it, so that 
bargaining resumed, if more rarely. 
 For my part I look on these efforts with interest and (if I can talk myself into it) with hope. But I 
have to admit I cannot quell my doubts. They are suggested to me by experiences of the socialist 
system, with its governance of regulation, commands, and prohibitions to the ultimate degree. If a 
regulator introduces a regulatory weapon, those to be regulated soon discover a counter-weapon. The 
lawyers and financial experts devising the rules believe they have arrived at a wary enough regulation, 
                                                   
24 Strong counter-arguments are also heard. It is to be feared that the numerical limit enforced by the constitution  is 
unrealistic. The relevant passage in Hungary’s Basic Law, introduced in 2011, soon had to be amended to accommodate 
Hungary’s actual indebtedness. Here the budget constraint proved soft even at Basic Law level. 
25 It is another matter how far it is justified to go in lowering the tariffs artificially. There is no space here to analyze that 
difficult question. 
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but those on the ground – in the enterprise, NGO, or LGO – are busy too, far more conversant with the 
specific conditions, at least as wary, and able sooner or later to evade the regulation. The next step at 
the level above is make the fabric of prohibitions and regulations denser, to “refine” it and make it 
more detailed.26 It is to be feared that this becomes a self-generating tendency that leads to over-
regulation. 
 The idea is often raised that the hard budget constraint will punish the organization for its 
wrongdoings, excessive spending and irresponsible indebtedness. It is not the organization that should 
be punished but the individuals responsible for the wrong decisions. The system of incentives should be 
built so that the troubled organizations are rescued but the managers responsible for the trouble pay a 
heavy price, losing their jobs and privileges and breaking off their careers. There is a need at state 
legislative and internal regulatory levels for rules that establish a clear relation between bad 
management and individual atonement. 
 This line of thought is logically free of error and in line with the recommendations of 
publications in economics and management studies that deal with incentives. I would add that this type 
of sanctioning is endorsed with satisfaction by people with a healthy moral sense. In some cases the 
irresponsible managers do receive the punishment they deserve. Even if they have not broken the law, 
so that the sanctions are not applied in court, the sentence is carried out by the “invisible hand” of the 
official apparatus and the business world: managers making serious mistakes lose their jobs and 
reputations, and their career chances sharply decline. News of it spreads and acts as an important 
barrier to deepening of the SBC syndrome. Unfortunately, there are frequent counter-examples. Some 
bank, stock-broking firm, or corporation got into serious financial difficulties and was rescued, and 
meanwhile the managers were still getting their fat salaries and extra bonuses. Or they were dismissed 
from their jobs but the terms of their contracts guaranteed them generous golden handshakes – “golden 
umbrella” provisions in managers’ employment contracts ensure them. Such contract terms are 
perfectly legal and enforceable through the courts. For all these reasons, it becomes doubtful whether 
legal or administrative means can be used at all to apply with full consistency the principle of 
individual financial responsibility for financial failure. 
 One grave problem in this respect is that to impose legally a system of individual financial 
responsibility goes against the major historical current in the transformation of capitalist ownership 
relations: the limitation of personal liability toward paying debts. Capitalism begins with a rock-hard 
                                                   
26 “Is centralization a solution to the soft budget constraint problem?” is the expressive title of a study by Ben-Bassat, 
Dahan, and Klor (2013), who put the question in relation to fiscal decentralization. Based on the authors’ experience in 
Israel the answer is no.  
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budget constraint.  (See my 1993 article “The Evolution of Financial Discipline under the Postsocialist 
System”, which reappears as Chapter 7 in this volume.) Originally there are tough laws to back loan 
contracts: debtor, pay, or we will lock you up in the debtors’ prison!27 From the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, however, there appeared a great institutional innovation: the limited liability 
company, whereby the owners are liable for the company’s debts only up to the amount of their 
investment in it; their private fortunes cannot be touched. This new legal institution developed further 
as the joint stock company and other limited liability forms. Thereafter came a rapidly accelerating 
demand from limited liability companies for credit. Far more entrepreneurs were prepared to use credit 
to try out innovations, which brought huge profits if successful but with a high risk of failure. The 
supply of credit grew in parallel to the demand. Creditors, in setting their terms (interest, term, security, 
etc.), allowed for the fact that some debtors would fail to meet the conditions. They set aside 
contingency reserves and so on, as the well-known history of capitalist development relates. Without 
such limitation of personal liability, the rate of growth in past centuries and the innovation process 
radically altering people‘s life would not have occurred, or occurred so fast. 
 But once it had happened, the favorable effects on growth and innovation were associated with 
the appearance of the SBC syndrome, as a harmful side-effect of the limitation of personal liability for 
debt. In fact this is one of the deepest roots of the SBC syndrome. This is the main reason why the 
syndrome can be seen as a genetically coded disease of modern capitalism.  
Those thinking over how to ease the SBC syndrome should look not only at suitable legislation, 
regulation, and financial incentives, but at moral incentives as well. This side of the question is 
discussed in detail in my 2013 article “Breaking Promises” (Chapter 13 in this volume). Many still take 
the view learned from their parents, schoolteachers, and literary readings that honest people should 
keep their word. If you have promised to pay back a loan, do so.28 Of course, moral preaching often 
elicits a derisive smile and a cynical shrug from some people. I count myself among the idealists who 
are not prepared to accept this silently. Though I concede that the weight of moral conviction is limited, 
                                                   
27 Dickens’ superbly drawn character Wilkins Micawber in David Copperfield reiterates what is still known as the 
Micawber Principle: “Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen pounds nineteen and six, result 
happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.” Poor 
Micawber departs widely from his own strict principle and finds himself in a debtors’ prison, from which he is luckily 
rescued. 
28 An article in an influential periodical for the American intelligentsia (Kuttner 2013 reviewing Graeber 2012) quotes a 
conversation Graeber had with a lawyer at a garden party on the legitimacy of the IMF imposing austerity on third-world 
nations: “‘But,’ she objected as if this were self-evident, ‘they’d borrowed the money! Surely one has to pay one’s 
debts.’” Robert Kuttner, a noted economic journalist, quotes Graeber’s comment that the statement “is so persuasive 
because it’s not actually an economic statement: it’s a moral statement,” and adds himself: “A debt, by definition, is 
something you owe that must be repaid.” Also revealing about how this piece will strike a non-economist reader is its 
title: “The Debt We Shouldn’t Pay.” 
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I still count it among the tools for curbing the harmful outcome of the SBC syndrome. 
  
Contacts with other approaches 
 
The three previous sections of the Introduction sought with varying success to describe reality: what 
the SBC syndrome is and what can be done against its harmful effects. Let us now move to the sphere 
of ideas, to analyze the notions, models, and research directions connected with the SBC phenomenon. 
 
Institutional and behavioral economics 
All the questions treated in the studies in this volume and reviewed in this Introduction are not just 
compatible with the outlooks of institutional and behavioral economics, they clearly belong to them. 
 The SBC syndrome offers an illustrative example of the basic context in which the two schools 
touch on each other, although differ in many other respects, or more precisely, in which they overlap. 
This basic context is that the specified lasting conjunction between certain institutions give rise to well-
defined behavioral patterns. Indeed there is more to it than that: shedding light on the SBC syndrome 
adds to our understanding when the causal relation [institution → behavioral pattern] is placed in a 




Let us think over the following experiment in our minds. We conduct individual interviews with some 
economists whom we assume to be conversant with the SBC, because they have read about it and 
perhaps even applied its conceptual apparatus. We recruit the interviewees mainly from the post-
socialist region, but some may never have lived in our parts, just come here on EBRD or World Bank 
business, or they may be university people who have specialized in comparative economics or research 
into the socialist system. We say the expression “soft budget constraint” and then ask them for free 
associations with it, whatever springs to mind. 
 Then we conduct another series of interviews, this time with well-qualified Western economists, 
who have never had a work about the SBC in their hands before. To them we give the expression 
“moral hazard,” and ask them also for the free associations that spring to mind. 
 Nobody has conducted such an experiment, but I am certain of this: there will be a high degree 
of overlap between the two sets of ideas that spring to the groups’ minds. 
 Can it be concluded that this is really just a case of two kinds of terminology? Are “soft budget 
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constraint” and “moral hazard” synonymous? Did first I then others do nothing more than find new 
names for long-known phenomena? Or as the ironic saying puts it: new wine in old bottles? In my view 
the distinction is much greater. I would like to recall first of all that although the idea was sparked by 
socialist experience, “soft budget constraint” does not derive from Soviet or East European 
terminology, but from the vocabulary of mainstream economics. The budget constraint on a household 
comes up in the first lesson of any course of microeconomics, along with a textbook graph with a line 
representing the constraint. Later, when the same course reaches the general equilibrium theory, there is 
no budget constraint on the firm: traditional theory has it that its behavior is adequately represented by 
the objective function of profit maximization.29 One reason why many Western-trained economists 
accepted the expression easily was that the usage was very familiar. 
 The first section of the Introduction dealt with the expression “soft budget constraint” in detail. 
Here I will attempt only to interpret the expression moral hazard (MH). It appeared originally in 
insurance terminology.30 The knowledge that the insurer will cover any damage prompts the insured to 
be less careful about avoiding it. Furthermore, once the damage has occurred, the insured is less 
concerned about the consequences of it, which the insurer is expected to cover as well.31 
 The expression was adopted and interpreted more widely in economics (see Arrow 1963 and 
1965). For instance, bank deposits have long been insured in various ways in case the bank should be 
unable to repay them due to unexpected events (e. g. a run on the bank). The knowledge that it is 
insured encourages the bank to be less careful in placing credit and even to take dangerously high risks. 
To put it more generally, MH describes a situation in which an actor is inclined to take risks whose 
costs will be borne by another actor. 
 As the economics of information developed, the interpretation of MH expanded further. Under 
the new concept it becomes a type of asymmetric information. Take a transaction in which one party 
(the insured, say) knows more than the other (the insurer). The former is protected from risk (fully or 
partly) while aware of its own decisions. The other party does not have information about the former’s 
doings, but pays for the consequences of them. This approach to the problem provided fruitful 
inspiration high-level, intellectually stimulating works (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). 
 Theoretical literature on MH relates closely to contract theory and principal–agent theory. 
                                                   
29 In this respect introducing the budget constraint can be seen as innovation in the model of a firm’s behavior. 
30 Quite early in my writings on the SBC there appeared the simile: "The state is acting like an overall insurance company 
taking over all the moral hazards with the usual well-known consequences: the insured will be less careful in protecting 
his wealth." (See the article “The Soft Budget Constraint,” which appeared first  in the Swiss journal Kyklos in 1986 and 
forms Chapter 5 of this volume.) Sadly I did not go beyond the simile for a long time, to explore the literature on MH 
closely enough. 
31 The word “moral” may have appeared here because a moral insured would not handle carelessly assets in its charge even 
without financial incentives not to do so. 
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Moral hazard rests on the fact that no contract is “perfect,” it cannot cover the tiniest details. One party 
(the supplier, say) may abuse that by counting on the other party fulfilling their obligations (in this 
example by paying the contract price), because they are unable to check every detail. Even in this 
outline example the question of monitoring arises. This is one of the central issues in the principal–
agent relationship. No principal can ever monitor the agent perfectly. So what incentive does the agent 
have to serve the principal’s interests well? (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005, Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 Again I am only introducing in outline a rich and ever-expanding field of MH research working 
at the level of pure theory. The questions raised by these researchers touch upon problems that also 
occupy researchers into the SBC phenomenon. They do not embrace the whole subject of the SBC, just 
some important aspects of it, analyzing mainly those to do with information and incentives. 
 Meanwhile many researchers have been applying the concept of MH to practical economic 
policy. “Moral hazard” appeared in the title of the 2007 Financial Times article by Larry Summers that 
I mentioned earlier. This evoked strong reactions for and against, with the MH system of concepts as 
the “native language” of the debate. In content it overlapped with the questions of most concern in the 
literature on the SBC: Should the troubled big companies and banks be rescued? Is it right to make 
taxpayers pay for the results of harmful acts by poorly operating micro-level units? What are the 
dangers if some important micro-level unit collapses and a domino effect ensues? Will the outcome of 
such interventions be long-term ill-effects on the thinking of decision-makers? There appeared 
numerous empirical studies, not only in the business press, but in academic journals, which applied the 
concepts and arguments of MH theory to analyzing the latest financial crash. A good example is an 
article by Chang (2000), whose title says much: “The Hazard of Moral Hazard: Untangling the Asian 
Crisis.” There is conspicuously much in common between the empirical literature employing the MH 
ideas outlined here and works that analyze the SBC syndrome. 
 Though I do not wish to appear immodest, I risk the following assertion: Despite  essential 
overlaps between MH and the SBC syndrome, the literature of the latter has  contributed and will 
contribute substantial extra knowledge to that introduced by the MH literature. 
 There is food for thought in the contrasting starting points of the two descriptions. MH starts 
from the dilemma of the insurer, the rescuer, the bailer out, and what effect there will be on its 
behavior. Moral hazard arises as a consequence of its decisions. With the SBC sphere of ideas the 
approach is through the behavior of troubled (or potentially troubled) micro-level units. Think of those 
Western economic advisers who arrived for the first time in the countries behind the Iron Curtain in 
1989–90. It was as if the concepts of moral hazard had been erased from their vocabulary. They 
immediately adopted the parlance of SBC when confronted with the low-efficiency enterprises of 
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socialism. In almost all cases their economic policy proposals involved hardening the budget 
constraint. In other words, the MH line of argument derives from observation of the financial sector: 
how decisions made by the finance ministry, the banks, the stock exchange, and in the offices of the 
financial managers of firms have an effect. Analysts thinking in terms of the SBC syndrome look first 
at the real economy and the behavior of firms providing goods and services. 
 Even the term “moral hazard” reflects that it focuses primarily on risk-taking and risk-sharing. 
The problems of risk are important also in the SBC outlook, but the syndrome may also be manifest in 
institutional configurations and behavior patterns unrelated to risk-taking. 
 MH literature, whether taking a theoretical approach or one of empirical economic policy, looks 
at matters mainly from the side of information and incentives. SBC literature shows much wider 
interests: the deeper social and institutional roots of incentives, their relation to political institutions, 
and to the general nature of socialism and capitalism. In this respect it exceeds the traditional study area 
of economics to include fields normally belonging to sociology and political science. The SBC 
syndrome builds a specific social relation between rescuee and rescuer (both actual and potential in 
both cases). Those below are at the mercy of those above. And those above make use of those they 
exploit, if possible so shaping matters itself that there appears and persists a relation between 
defenselessness and power. 
 The diversity of SBC literature can prove productive. MH literature, especially that on 
empirical, economic-policy matters, concentrates largely on the financial sphere. Of course, enterprises 
and banks appear in SBC literature as well, but we can read in it also about the SBC problems of 
LGOs, hospitals, sports clubs, and agricultural lobbies. 
 MH literature examines the phenomenon through two disciplines: economics and to an extent 
political science. SBC literature takes a more inclusive, multidisciplinary approach, calling on the 
explanatory aids not only of economics and political science, but the outlooks, concepts, and 
methodologies of disciplines such as political and economic history, sociology, individual and social 
psychology, jurisprudence, and ethics. 
 The next section of the Introduction will return to how this gap between the two approaches 
occurred and what can be done to narrow it. 
 
Time inconsistency 
One popular subject in pure theoretical researches employing mathematical models is time 
inconsistency: how to explain that rational decision-makers, who should behave with strict consistency 
according to the postulates of theory, manage still to be inconsistent in their decisions over time. 
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Something is promised seriously at one moment, yet the promise is not kept. If the promise embraced a 
threat and the threat is not carried out, reputation is lost and the credibility of the threat is weakened 
(the credible threat problem).32 Following the renaissance in the application of game theory in 
economics, time inconsistency also came to concern researchers working in the field of pure theory. 
 The problem shouts out to be examined by modeling with the tools of game theory. The first to 
devise such a game-theory model was Schaffer (1989). A few years later came a study by Mathias 
Dewatripont and Eric Maskin (1995) that made a big advance by examining the time inconsistency of 
the SBC phenomenon through a model that used a clear, transparent example. (See our joint 2004 study 
“The Soft Budget Constraint,” republished as Chapter 11 of this volume, which includes a short 
account of the Dewatripont–Maskin model.) The financing center issues a call to observe financial 
discipline and not exceed the budget constraint: units should not count on a bailout – it will not rescue 
them if they get into trouble. Trouble ensues despite the warning and the center breaks its word by 
resigning itself to a bailout after all. It can be shown in terms of the theoretical model that the state, 
under certain conditions, is acting rationally in reneging on its threat and performing the bailout. 
Similar relations may develop between a bank and its creditor. The bank initially sets hard terms, but 
later shows itself open to renegotiating them after all. 
 The Dewatripont–Maskin study aroused great interest. Only then did many economists realize 
that the SBC was not a transient metaphor, but something serious. The problem could be modeled: that 
recognition lent it authority.33 Several studies appeared that applied the model either to a practical field 
or as a basis of further development. The large number of references in Chapter 11 includes pre-2003 
works that used a similar approach. These were followed by further studies employing a similar 
methodology. 
 Applying the models of time inconsistency was of great profit to SBC research. I do not wish to 
detract from that recognition in the least when I warn of a need for caution. I have met with 
interpretations that construe time inconsistency as the essence of the SBC phenomenon, its central idea. 
Some go still further, to equate the explanatory model of the center that breaks a promise to withhold a 
bailout as the SBC theory itself. That interpretation I cannot agree with. Time inconsistency is one 
element in the explanatory theory of the SBC syndrome, one panel in a complex theoretical edifice – an 
important panel, but not the whole edifice. SBC theory is a far more comprehensive and complex 
                                                   
32 The dynamics of the SBC was first studied in an article by Judit Szabó, 1988, comparing it with a prior and continual 
softness of the budget constraint. 
33 In fact mathematical models of other SBC subjects had been designed before. See Chapter 4 of this volume (Kornai and 
Weibull 1983) and the works of Goldfeld and Quandt (1988, 1990 and 1993). But the Dewatripont and Maskin study 
marked the real breakthrough with theoretical economists. 
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construct than that. 
 I cannot conceive of a mathematical model of which anyone could claim it was the SBC model. 
The SBC is too complex and multifarious for any manageable mathematical model to represent it 
comprehensively. I would be content if a succession of theoretical researchers were to devise various 
models, each reflecting different features of the syndrome. 
 I have discussed at two separate points the overlap of the SBC sphere of ideas with the literature 
on moral hazard and on time inconsistency. These are indeed treated as distinct in the literature using 
mathematical models. (See, for example, one of the books offering the best theoretical account: Bolton 
and Dewatripont 2005.) While two different model groups have developed in the realm of theoretical 
models, in the SBC syndrome of the real world the two kinds of phenomena (and a good many others) 
are intertwined.  
  
Fiscal decentralization 
The tasks that involve budget spending are split in some way between central and local government, 
and so are the revenues from taxation and other compulsory levies. What are the existing divisions and 
what the desirable ones forms an important chapter in the study of public finance (e. g. Stiglitz 2000, 
part 6). 
 The SBC syndrome appears, as mentioned, in the relation between central government and 
LGOs. If an LGO meets serious financial trouble, there is no cause for it to cease activity, which would 
lead to anarchy. Should central government leave such LGOs to worm out of trouble as best they can? 
Or should they cover the debt and on what terms? Much rewarding work has gone into embedding the 
SBC findings into the wide research field of fiscal decentralization (such as Qian and Weingast 1997, 
Qian and Roland 1988, Goodspeed 2002, and Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005). A short review of these 
appears in Chapter 11 of this volume). The appendix to this Introduction looks at the SBC syndrome as 
exemplified in the fiscal decentralization of Hungary and the great central rescue acts performed in 
2010–2013. 
 
Entry and exit 
Entry and exit in the business sphere are studied in microeconomics in the theory of market structures. 
Also involved, somewhat separately, is the developing field of business economics. 
 Many interesting observations have been made toward identifying the regularities of entry, 
fewer toward the analysis of exit. The SBC syndrome opens up a new side to the question. Bailout, 
particularly serial rescue, can be seen as keeping a firm alive artificially. The SBC syndrome stands in 
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the way of natural corporate death. 
 At this point our subject-matter impinges on theories of evolution applied in economic activity. 
The population of firms undergoes processes of natural selection, which are modified by the SBC, 
when the failure of doomed firms is slowed down or halted. 
 Examination of the SBC syndrome also ties in with Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction 
(Schumpeter [1942] 2010). He and many later economists saw creation, building, and innovation on the 
one hand and dismantling and the termination of stalled organizations on the other as two parallel, 
interlocked processes. What the SBC syndrome does is to impede or halt the second while retaining the 
old, so that the crises only clear the way in part for technical development. Arguments against bailouts 
based on a Schumpeterian line of argument are sometimes heard  in theoretical and policy debates on 
handling the crisis. 
 The points of contact and overlap are clear from what has been said: there are many references 
to them in the literature on the SBC. But the researchers into entry and exit,  theories of economic 
evolution, growth theories that developed in the wake of Schumpeter, and the listed phenomena have 
yet to admit into their field of examination the subject-matter of the SBC syndrome and its conceptual 
system and methodology. 
 
Political clientelism 
Here I refer to quite a recent research field in political science, only a decade or two old (Piattoni 2001, 
Roniger 2004). It was mentioned in the first section describing the SBC syndrome, among the motives 
behind it: bailout is one benefit that political “patrons” can bestow on clients. (See the Appendix to the 
Introduction.) 
 As far as I have managed to follow the political-science literature on the subject, the researchers 
have yet to realize how well political clientelism can be captured by observing where and which 
economic unit is rescued from grave financial trouble by various political forces, and which social 
groups receive regular financial support. There is significant overlap of content between the SBC 
syndrome and the instances of political clientelism. 
 
The research program on the SBC syndrome 
 
The last section reviewed several themes and lines of research developed within various disciplines that 
can be shown to have subjects of examination that not only tie in with the subject of the volume, but 
partially overlap with it. I must stress that the overlap is partial. They are not identical with it. The 
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measurement and explanation of the SBC system is a separate subject. To use a phrase of Imre Lakatos 
(1978), there is a distinct research program running its own course here. 
 
The present situation – good news 
There may be scientific researchers quite aloof from the reception their work receives and concerned 
only with the actual performance, but my hunch is that most are not indifferent to their reception, shy 
though they may be to admit it. For my part I declare interest in the reception I get, from colleagues and 
fellow economists and beyond them from a wider public. So I have tried to collect information on how 
widespread the ideas connected with the SBC are. This means assessing the reception not only of my 
publications but of those of others, for as time passes, more and more people join in the research, and I 
would like to gauge the reception of the common work of all of us. Let me begin by presenting the 
positive side. 
 The commonest measure of the influence of scientific publications is the number of citations 
they receive. Of the many sources I could utilize, I have chosen just one: the search engine Google 
Scholar. This records that the English versions of Chapter 1 of this volume received 685 citations, 
Chapter 5 1065 citations, and Chapter 11 658 citations.34 This Introduction drew attention to two other 
important works: Dewatripont and Maskin 1995 on game theory models received 1224 citations,  and 
the article Qian and Roland 1998 on fiscal decentralization was cited in 1035 publications. These also 
appeared in other languages, so that their aggregate numbers of citations are substantially greater. 
 The number of works whose subject was theoretical analysis of the SBC phenomenon or which 
explore experience with it in some sector reflects a deeper influence than citations counts do. Those 
who go beyond referring to SBC writings by others and themselves examine it can be counted as 
having joined in our research. We have no kind of statistics on this at our disposal. Some impression of 
the thematic structure of the research can be had like this:35 Entering “soft budget constraint” in the 
Google search engine on March 4, 2014 brings up 134 mentions in the writing of others.36 Since I 
                                                   
34 It must be remembered when interpreting the official statistics that as this Introduction makes clear, the readers of my 
book Economics of Shortage were the first to pay much attention to the SBC, although the idea had been aired in an 
earlier publication. The English edition of the book (1980) received 2638 citations, most often to the chapter on the 
SBC. To this must be added the citations of the other six language editions. 
35 The count was done by Ádám Kerényi. His report appears on my website, www.kornai-janos.hu/Kalligram4_hatter.html, 
among the background materials that follow this article. 
 For a proper interpretation of the above analysis let me add that entering the expression “soft budget constraint” 
into Google will return over 300,000 hits. Experts on Google warn that the number of hits presented are not reliable 
estimates. Therefore our analysis is based on the Google hits (51 altogether) that return actual publications.  In reality 
there are considerably more (but probably considerably fewer than 300,000) texts to be found via Google. 
36 First all writings of which I was author or co-author were eliminated, then the multiple references found in the same 
article in 51 cases, and finally the mere passing references. The SBC problem is the major topic or a substantially 
discussed sub-topic of the remaining 134 papers. 
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entered the phrase in English, the result does not include the references in Hungarian, or in Chinese, 
Russian, Polish and other languages. Of the 134 papers, 61 can be classed as theoretical in nature and 
73 as empirical. The numbers of the latter according to area of study are administration (fiscal 
decentralization) 31, the financial sector 25, the health sector 7, industry 3, agriculture 2, and other 
fields in 5 cases. The empirical studies concerned the following countries: China in 22 cases, Italy in 7, 
Germany in 4, Japan in 4, Ukraine in 3, and Brazil, Czech Republic, United States, Russia, Romania, 
and Sweden each in 2 cases. A further 21 publications dealt with a European, Asian or African region, 
or with several countries comprehensively.37 Also considered separately were the pages found by the 
Google search engine for the Hungarian phrase for SBC: puha költségvetési korlát. Of these empirical 
works, 12 dealt with Hungary itself. 
 Analysis of the Google results showed a broadening of approach (theoretical or empirical) in 
the SBC research, in terms of the sphere or sector and of the countries examined. This broadening was 
examined with another methodology, by counting how many papers had appeared in the twenty leading 
English-language economics journals that not only mentioned the SBC phenomenon in passing, but 
discussed it throughout, or at least made use of its system of concepts or analytical apparatus.38 The 
most articles, 30 in all, appeared in the most influential title of all, the Journal of Economic Literature. 
(Of these I wrote two, one alone and one with co-authors; the other 28 were by other hands.) I would 
also emphasize the Journal of Economic Perspectives (22, of which I wrote two), the American 
Economic Review (20, of which I wrote one), the Journal of Financial Economics (13, all by other 
authors), I have specified the authorship in each case to point out how many have joined the program, 
and on a high level, which underlines that journals known to be very selective were accepting them. 
Writings to do with the SBC are appearing not only in generalized journals, but in those dealing with 
sub-disciplines as well. The appearance of articles concerned with the SBC in leading journals covering 
finance, environmental economics, growth theory, or economic geography is important evidence of the 
broadening of the research program. 
 Turning to lexicons and encyclopedic treatments, among the many with an entry on the soft (or 
soft and hard) budget constraint are the Oxford Dictionary of Economics (Black 2002), the New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Eatwell, Millgate, and Newman 1987) and the Palgrave Dictionary 
of Law and Economics (Newman 1998). 
                                                   
37 To avoid duplication, the empirical works dealing with Hungary were omitted from the list of works written in English, 
as they would usually have appeared in Hungarian as well. These will be covered separately. 
38 The examination was conducted by Miklós Rosta, whose account can be read on my website www.kornai-
janos.hu/Kalligram4_hatter.html, among the background materials that follow this article. We classed the periodicals 
with the greatest five-year impact factor as “leading.” A list of these and other information on the examination can be 
found on my website. 
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 Many references to the SBC do not mention my name, which suggests the expression became 
part of the public domain.  
 In 2000, one of the most influential organs of the economics profession, the Journal of 
Economic Literature, placed at the disposal of myself and co-authors Eric Maskin and Gérard Roland a 
large amount of space in which to present the SBC syndrome and researches relating to it. (The study is 
republished as Chapter 11 of this volume.) This publication opportunity could be construed as an 
important step toward the canonization of SBC theory by the profession. 
 At this point I could conclude the report and record the spread of the idea of the SBC as one of 
the greatest successes in my professional life. I am not doing so because I wish to add objective 
information on the unfavorable side of the situation. 
 
The present situation – bad news 
The expression “soft budget constraint” and its related theoretical and empirical work have gained 
professional currency mainly among a circle whose members specialize in studying the socialist system 
and postsocialist transition. I place in this circle such members of the profession in the postsocialist 
region who retain interest in the socialism/capitalism comparison and the postsocialist transition. It 
includes also economists living outside the region once surrounded by the Iron Curtain, who dealt with 
the region as advisers, analysts and academic researchers. 
 It is another matter with the rest of the profession, which actually forms the vast majority. They 
include many who were induced to notice the SBC research prorgam and join in it, as financial or 
health-care economists or those dealing with information or contract theory. Several mentions have 
been made of them in the Introduction. But however imposing the “good news” may be, the SBC 
research program has not broken through to most of them. Let me mention three fields as examples to 
support this negative statement. 
1. The economics profession divides into numerous groups and partial disciplines; many schools 
exist side by side. The research on the SBC syndrome has to break through primarily where the 
intellectual kinship is strongest. I pointed out in an earlier section that there is the greatest overlap with 
two such: institutional and behavioral economics. This provides enough grounds to examine a few 
prestigious English-language journals about the two. Altogether five journals were examined for the 
period 2010–2013.39 These journals include altogether only five contributions where the expression 
                                                   
39 The examination was done by Eszter Rékasi, whose report appears on my website www.kornai-
janos.hu/Kalligram4_hatter.html, among the background materials about this article. It includes, for instance, the names 
and figures for the journals examined. 
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“soft budget constraint” occurs. 
2. Let us look at another highly important field of publications: the world’s financial and 
economic-policy press. The two weightiest titles, the Financial Times and Economist, were examined 
for the period 2010–2013. Economic politicians, economic journalists, and academic economists 
publishing there often concern themselves with questions relating to the SBC syndrome and its 
concepts and analytical apparatus, yet such writings seldom appeared there.  
3 The question was examined separately in relation to analyses of the last financial crisis. Western 
literature, from dailies through the economic press to academic journals, made little use of the SBC 
approach, with some notable exceptions.40  
 Typical are the study Boone and Johnson (2010) and the book Blinder (2014), both of which 
analyzed the last financial crisis thoroughly and from many angles. They touched on many phenomena 
discussed also in the writings in this volume, without using the experience recounted in the SBC 
literature or any arguments or methods of analysis belonging to the SBC sphere. To take another 
example, I read two studies concurrently on the Asian crisis while preparing this Introduction. One was 
written by distinguished exponents of SBC research (Huang and Xu 1999) and the other by a 
mainstream economist (Chang 2000). The latter drew nothing from the apparatus of the SBC research 
program. Yet the works that avoided the SBC apparatus could also have gained by employing the 
findings and methods of the analysis of the SBC syndrome while retaining their own battery of 
methods in full. It would have helped them to delve deeper into the problem of the crisis. 
 How come the SBC, as a developing, broadening research program dating back several decades, 
has still not penetrated the thinking of the majority of economists?41 Only an attempt can be made here 
to answer the question, and hard though I strive to be dispassionate, complete absence of bias cannot be 
guaranteed due to my personal involvement. I think it might be an attractive topic for those involved in 
the sociology of science  to study what makes the spread of a scientific idea easier or more difficult.  
 I must look first for an explanation in myself, and, although not entitled by them to do so, in the 
colleagues of mine who joined early in working on the SBC sphere of ideas. We have not done enough 
to spread our ideas. I will give just one example. I reported a few lines above that the subject-matter of 
the SBC does not feature at all in the respected journals of institutional and behavioral economics. I 
have to admit that neither I nor my immediate colleagues have ever tried to place an article on the 
                                                   
40 The exceptions include Prof. Hans-Werner Sinn, president of the prestigious IFO institute in Munich (see  Sinn 2010) 
and Prof. Willem Buiter, a former member of Britain’s Monetary Council, now chief economist with Citigroup (see 
Buiter 2009), whose writings expressly use SBC theory in their arguments. 
41 Lakatos (1978) draws a distinction between developing and degenerating research programs. All that has been said in the 
“good news” section confirms that this program is in a developing stage. 
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subject in these journals; we have not attended their conferences in order to spread the SBC ideas in 
lectures. 
 The expressions “institution,” “behavior,” and “conduct” are among the basic words in my 
professional vocabulary.42 They are natural components of the mode of thinking that has guided my 
research from the time of writing of my first book in 1955 to this Introduction, written in March 2014. 
Yet I have to admit I was slow in examining publications from workshops of institutional and 
behavioral economics. I cited them only now and again and did not join their professional 
organizations. Perhaps it was a kind of tit-for-tat feeling that kept me back, sorry though I am to have to 
say it. Had they not noticed I had been an institutional economist and a behavioral economist for a 
long, long time? What could I learn from them? It is a shame it turned out like that. 
 Looking back on how my thoughts and writings evolved, the reluctance I just described may 
also have appeared in the scant attention I paid to the literature on moral hazard. I have mentioned an 
early paper of mine that referred to a similarity between the SBC phenomenon and insurance. Although 
I was familiar with the concept of moral hazard, introduced in insurance theory, I did not adopt it in my 
own vocabulary, make use of available analogies, or delve into the interesting literature on the subject – 
sadly, as my work was the loser. Had my colleagues and I been more open to this tradition of concepts 
and ideas, we might have broken down the barrier there to the ideas and concepts of the SBC. 
 I could even end my search for causes here. I have said what depended on me and might expect 
others to write what depended on them. But I will not stop yet. Balanced objectiveness obliges me to 
express a view on what explains the disinclination to notice the research into the SBC syndrome. Let 
me move from narrower relations with the institutional and behavioral schools to a few comments on a 
broader scale: why the majority of the economics profession did not accept and embrace the findings of 
the research program into the SBC. 
 It is a well-known trait of the intelligentsia to insist on certain words and accustomed 
expressions deeply embedded in them. They do not move to other words or expressions even if they 
would be more comfortable. For example, economists trained at Western universities learnt and grew 
accustomed early to the phrase moral hazard. They followed a routine in broadening its original 
meaning to apply to problems of the moment (e. g. analysis of the recent crisis). They have no inner 
urge to seek another mode of expression. 
 However, there is a deeper, more salient reason than terminological conservatism why the 
research apparatus of the SBC syndrome did not spread more widely: it arose originally in relation to 
                                                   
42 To quote the summary remarks at the end of my Economics of Shortage (1980), “definite social relations and 
institutional conditions generate definite forms of behavior, economic regularities and norms." (p. 583).  
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state-owned enterprises under the socialist system. If anyone in an American university economics 
faculty or in the offices of an international economic weekly ever heard of it, it was saved in his 
memory this way: SBC is something associated with a socialist state-owned firm. Why should it be 
noteworthy if it occurs in such a distorted, absurd, scarcely workable economic system? 
 The truth is that the most Western economists had no interest in what happened behind the Iron 
Curtain, neither as a citizen nor as an intellectual concerned for the fate of the world. As the latter, of 
course, all focused on the arms race, the Cold War, and the fall of the Berlin Wall. But as specialists 
they were not much concerned with the workings of a centrally directed economy, the ties between the 
center and the institutions subordinate to it, or what profit or loss meant to an enterprise. So the idea of 
the soft budget constraint did not catch their attention. 
 The ideas related to the SBC syndrome (with many other valuable ideas and findings) was 
consigned to the intellectual ghetto of social science to do with the socialist world. Nobody of course 
said openly that what interested us within socialism might be important to us but to them was 
intellectually irrelevant. But if I cannot quote the statement from some published work, let me affirm 
that this opinion is quite widespread in Western academic circles. That is why most professional 
economists in the world show no interest in the literature on the SBC syndrome. It does not occur to 
them that it could be relevant to the world in which they live or problems that intrigue them. They do 
not even pick such writings up, and so have not noticed what was underlined from the outset: the SBC 
syndrome may appear under capitalist economic conditions as well. (See the first, 1980 edition of 
Economics of Shortage, pages 311-322.)  
 I recorded it as a success that the SBC theory was “semi-canonized.” I now list it as a failure 
that the “canonization” did not reach what could be the more important remainder. The key issue is 
education of future economists. It has not been included into economics courses. One pertinent piece of 
evidence is to measure what is treated and heard in textbooks for advanced courses for doctoral 
students. Eight textbooks were examined.43 It was found that none said a single word about the SBC 
concept or its theoretical and empirical literature. 
 Here I must return to self-examination, the first point in the causal analysis. I and other 
participants in the program are convinced that the ideas illuminating the SBC syndrome and methods 
developed to examine it provide extra knowledge that helps in understanding many important problems 
of our times, but our conviction did not influence the authors of the textbooks. The ironic remark of 
McCloskey (1998) that the key question is whether or not you convince your colleagues applies also to 
                                                   
43 The textbooks were examined by Eszter Rékasi, whose report, with a list of the examined works, appears on my website 
www.kornai-janos.hu/Kalligram4_hatter.html, among the background materials after this article. 
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this case. One group has been convinced, the other, presumably larger group has not.   
 
Research tasks 
Here I list what in my view are the most important lines of future research under the program.  
1. I would put first the expansion of empirical work. There are already many studies that back its 
statements with impressive econometric analysis; many good ideas have appeared on how to measure 
softness and hardness of the budget constraint and quantify their effects (e. g. Josselin, Padovano, and 
Rocaboy 2012). Processing the experiences may inspire theoretical work as well. 
2. I conjectured in the second section of the Introduction how soft or hard the budget constraint is 
in various present-day spheres of the economy. These conjectures need thorough empirical research to 
check, clarify, and quantify them. I tried twenty years ago to initiate a comparative international survey 
on these lines, but it soon ran aground. Perhaps some day there will be an international body prepared 
to organize such a survey. 
3. There are huge gaps in the theoretical research into the SBC. The reactions to the first studies 
were positive, especially for the ones that placed the SBC problem into a game-theory context. But the 
pioneers, if I am not mistaken, have stepped aside and started on other topics. There hardly seem to 
appear any new attempts, even though the SBC syndrome has so many sides to it that it cries for 
mathematical modeling. 
4. Modeling of relations between the SBC syndrome and the theory of microeconomics remains 
unprocessed. There are several explanations in this volume that point to that possibility (see the 1980 
article “‘Hard’ and ‘soft’ budget constraint” in Chapter 2 and the 2004 article written with Maskin and 
Roland). To give a couple of examples, the usual models of the firm, the household, the market, and 
general equilibrium rest on the unstated implicit assumption that the decision-maker’s budget constraint 
is hard. What happens if that assumption is lifted and the model allows the decision-maker's budget 
constraint to be soft as well? What can be said of the demand function if the budget constraint is not 
hard? New questions are posed not only in microeconomics but in macroeconomics too if the effects of 
hardness and softness of the budget constraint are introduced.  
I did not have the strength to give a rigorous answer to these questions. I can only hope that 
researchers working on the filed of pure theory will turn to the subject sooner or later. 
5. I tried to show at several points in this Introduction that the SBC syndrome is not just a 
phenomenon of economics in the strict sense. It has essential political, legal, social, and psychological 
features as well. Yet so far it has been examined almost exclusively by economists. There is a great 
need for political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, and psychologists to join them in interdisciplinary 
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research on the subject. 
 The tasks are legion. I trust that research into this important and intellectually stimulating 
problem will continue to broaden and speed up.  
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A Hungarian case of the soft budget constraint syndrome at work 
Bailing out local government organizations (2011–2013) 
 
This Appendix is based on the study Vasvári˙(2013) and other publicly accessible information. It was 
felt we should not burden the readers of the book with statistical and methodological details of how the 
data in the tables were obtained; only the most important information is included in the notes to them. 
The detailed information on which the Appendix rests, including the methodology of the numerical 
estimates and the sources from which the table were compiled, can be found in the author’s website44.
 The Appendix handles the financial problems of the local government organizations (LGOs) 
solely in terms of the soft budget constraint (SBC) syndrome. A general description of Hungary’s 
budget decentralization and of the current legal and economic problems with this appear in the study by 
Tamás Vasvári mentioned and the literature referred to there. 
 
The mounting LGO indebtedness 
Hungary’s state budget falls into two parts: central government, and the LGOs of 3176 incorporated 
communities (villages, cities, districts of the capital), 19 counties and the capital. The local government 
subsystem covers its expenditures from three main sources: own revenues (local taxes and fees, 
privatization proceeds, etc.), grants received from the central budget, and loans. 
 Table F1 reveals that the stock of LGO debt was already substantial in 2006. Thereafter it rose 
to a peak in 2010 of HUF 1257 bn in the fourth quarter. Initially the LGOs mainly took up bank credit, 
but they came to realize it was more convenient to issue bonds, for which their appetite increased from 
2006 onward: the aggregate debt of LGOs in bond form rose 17 times over, from HUF 28 bn in the last 
quarter of 2006  to HUF 465 bn in the last quarter of 2010. 
 
Table F1  The debt stock of LGOs over the 2006–10 period (data for fourth quarters, HUF bn) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bonds 28 212 419 430 465 
Loans 543 574 562 584 609 
Revaluations –2 –3 48 73 182 
Total 569 783 1029 1087 1257 
Note: Revaluations cover year-end differences attributable to conversion of items 
denominated in foreign currency. 
Source: National Bank of Hungary. 
                                                   
44 See my website among the background materials for Volume IV www.kornai-janos.hu/Kalligram4_hatter.html.  
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 What induced LGOs to increase their debt stock so fast? How did they dare to do that? And 
what were creditors expecting when they extended loans to them on such a vast scale? It was stated in 
the Introduction that the SBC syndrome derives essentially from expectations built into decision-
makers at units potentially requiring rescue. Those raising loans expect that if unable to repay them, 
somebody will bail them out. That expectation had not been confirmed in the earlier experience of 
Hungarian LGOs, indeed it had been stated in the legal regulations that “the consequences of loss-
making operations will be born by the local-government organizations; the state budget takes no 
responsibility for their obligations.”45 But decision-makers could figure they would not be left in the 
lurch: no city, county or city district could be wound up like a factory or service provider. News went 
round that LGO heads had been reassured: feel free to borrow. News were spreading that LGO mayors 
had been all but encouraged to take loans without a doubt. Those declarations were said to be aired by 
certain political circles so that the popularity and electability of local chiefs could be improved through 
LGO investments and new installations effected on credit. Our researchers found no direct evidence of 
encouragement to borrow, but the SBC syndrome may still appear without it, based on the logic that a 
bailout would be inevitable. 
 The indebtedness was concentrated in a relatively small number of LGOs: 82.6 percent was 
owed by 150 LGOs at the end of 2010, i. e. by 4.7 percent of them. 
 The political allegiances of the LGOs were divided in the 2006–10 between the governing 
MSZP (socialists) and SZDSZ (liberals), the opposition (mainly the right-wing Fidesz–KDNP and 
MDF), and independents.46 The majority of mayors whose candidacy had been supported by 
parliamentary parties were linked with Fidesz–KDNP. The 2006–2010 increase in indebtedness was not 
a steady one. It also emerges from Table F2 that although it occurred in LGOs controlled by parties 
across the political spectrum, it was greater in those under Fidesz–KDNP control than in those under 
the control of a government party. 
 
Table F2 LGO indebtedness in the 2006–10 period 
Fidesz–
KDNP 
MSZP–SZDSZ Other  




Change in stock of indebtedness (HUF thousand) 
                                                   
45 Act LXV/1990 on local government, clause 90/2. The undertaking in the law (that central government is not 
answerable for LGO debts) and the strongly contradictory bailouts of 2011–13 serve as a vivid textbook 
example of the behavior pattern known in the theory as time inconsistency (Introduction, p.XX). 
46 In 2006-2010 MSZP and MSZP were the ruling parties and Fidesz–KDNP were in opposition. That was 
reversed in 2010-2014: Fidesz-KDNP took over the government, MSZP went in opposition, and SZDSZ 
disappeared from the political scene. 
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2006–2010  446 107 034 223 078 512 89 282 883 –3 298 493 
755 169 
936 
Indebtedness per capita (HUF thousand) 
2006  39.8 39.2 26.5 17.1 32.4 
2010  134.3 107.7 70.9 15.5 90.2 
Change in indebtedness per capita (percent) 
2006–2010  337.2 274.4 267.5 90.5 278.1 
Indebtedness per HUF one thousand of budget expenditure (HUF) 
2006  116.6 196.1 127.3 94.5 140.3 
2010  450.5 390 291.1 78.4 348.7 
Stock of indebtedness as a proportion of budget expenditure (percent) 
2006–2010 386.5 198.9 228.6 83 248.5 
Note: Figures for per capita indebtedness refer only to the debt of the LGOs. They do not 
include the  debts of the counties or the Capital City Government.  Determining the political 
affiliations in the case of  the counties the chair of the general assembly (and the assembly 
majority electing him or her) was considered, and in the case of the capital city the political 
body nominating the chief mayor.  
 A database for 803 LGOs was compiled to examine the relation between indebtedness 
and political affiliation. It included all LGOs except those with village and large-village status. 
But LGOs that would have been omitted on status grounds were still included if they met at 
least one of three further criteria: 1. over 5000 inhabitants, 2. a mayor who had stood as 
candidate for a party represented in the Parliament elected in 2010, or 3. debt that rose by over 
HUF 20 mn in the 2006–10 period. The “Not examined” column holds data for LGOs omitted 
from the database. The proportion of growth in debt stock attributable to these is under 0.5 
percent of aggregate growth. The proportion of LGOs examined can be taken as adequately 
representative. 
Sources: Hungarian State Treasury; National Electoral Office. 
 
Debt taken over 
The Fidesz–KDNP government that took power in 2010 altered radically the relation of central to local 
government by applying strong centralization. It assumed a sizeable proportion of the tasks hitherto 
performed by LGOs, and reassigned resources accordingly, to the detriment of local government. This 
process of fiscal centralization was augmented by a big bailout for indebted LGOs. The expectations in 
2006–2010 were fulfilled: there was indeed mass rescue of LGOs struggling to service their debts. 
 The process of rescue and assumption of debts (generally termed “consolidation”) occurred in 
several stages, not all at once. The proportions covered by the bailout differed between the categories. 
There was a category where the law prescribed a clear bailout proportion. With the counties and with 
settlements with fewer than 5000 inhabitants, central government took over not only their bank debts, 
but those to their suppliers. But there was a category where the law initially laid down “from–to” 
limits, the specific proportion of bailout being agreed case-by-case between central government and 
local government representatives. Such procedure applied in 2013 to the partial consolidations of the 
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LGOs of settlements with over 5000 inhabitants. Finally, in February 2014, the LGOs became 
practically free of debt, after their full debts as of the end of 2013 were taken over. 
 Several factors may have contributed to the degree to which debt was taken over in these 
categories, or where the law left leeway within a category, what case-by-case proportion applied; 
political affiliation was presumably not the only one, but the figures suggest it was one (Table F3). This 
is clear also because central government several times departed strongly from its objectively set ideas 
on the proportions of the debt it was prepared to take over. Table F4 compares the predetermined and 
actual proportions of consolidation. It appears there was hardly any difference for LGOs linked with 
the MSZP, but for those linked with Fidesz–KDNP, the large-scale consolidations were far greater than 
foreseen. 
 
Table F3  The size and affiliation structure of debt consolidations 
  Fidesz–KDNP MSZP Other 
 
Affiliation of the mayor from 2010 
Total 
Size of consolidation (HUF thousands) 
Counties and capital city 369 407 161 − − 369 407 161 
Settlements with under 5000 
inhabitants (to 31 December 
2012) 21 475 442 1 458 056 50 960 942 73 894 440 
Settlements with over 5000 
inhabitants and the February 
2014 consolidation 
696 436 416 65 700 202 168 548 214 930 684 832 
Total  1 087 319 019 67 158 258 
219 509 
156 1 373 986 433 
Per capita consolidation 
spending (HUF thousand) 
123.7 98.9 61.1 99.6 
Consolidation per HUF 
thousand of budget 
expenditure (HUF) 
594 410.3 288 498.4 
Note. Figures for per capita indebtedness refer only to the debt of the LGOs. They do not 
include those of the counties or the Capital City Government. The basis of comparison for 
calculating the HUF thousand expenditure was the expenditure in 2012. Additional 
assumptions had to be applied to the estimates as the consolidation was effected in several 
stages. These are detailed on the website. As far as the counties are concerned, the chair of 
the general assembly (and the assembly majority electing him or her) was considered and in 
the capital city the political body nominating the chief mayor. 






Table F4  The predetermined and actual scales of the consolidations (percent) 
  
 Fidesz–KDNP MSZP Other Total  
 Affiliation of the mayor from 2010  
Average predetermined proportion (1) 48.9 47.2 52.8 50.1 
Average actual proportion (2) 59.5 48.7 57 58 
(2/1) 122 103 108 116 
Note. The proportions of debt consolidations were estimated using a simple arithmetical mean. 
Sources. Ministry of the Interior; National Electoral Office. 
 
Table F4 supports statements made about clientelism on pages XX of the Introduction. Not only 
the rescuee has an interest in it passing on its debts, but the rescuer as well. The process of rescue and 
the differentiation in scale of consolidation help tighten the affiliations and loyalty of the rescuee, at a 
lower level in the hierarchy, to the rescuer at the higher level.  
 
The “losses” of thrifty LGOs 
Newspaper headlines were quoted on page XX of the Introduction intimating that heads of LGOs that 
had accumulated little debt could regret their thrifty use of public money later. Settlements that spent 
boldly and became seriously indebted received generous compensation  in the form of a “national 
donation” paid for by the taxpayers of the whole country. Table F5 gives estimates of scale: how much 
“loss” they suffered by having smaller debts that were offset by smaller compensation, or no debts at 
all. 
 
Table F5 Estimate of the “lost national donation” suffered by thrifty LGOs 
Debt per capita, 2011 
 HUF 50 100–100 000 
HUF 50 000 or 
less No debt 
No. of LGOs 218 1460 1215 
HUF thousand “lost” 25 289 564 155 710 967 61 257 852 
HUF “lost” per capita 18 300 46 700 48 400 
HUF “lost” per HUF thousand of 
expenditure 85.9 214.6 238.1 
Note. The database for the table does not include the counties or the Capital City Government, 
or settlements that had not completed their consolidation by the end of 2012. The estimates of 
the “lost national donation” were obtained by establishing the average per capita 
consolidation by type of settlement, subdivided into those with more or fewer than 5000 
inhabitations. The difference between the average and actual value received was divided by 
the number of inhabitants of the category, and this was taken as the “lost national donation.”  
Source. Hungarian State Treasury. 
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Communities not covered by the debt consolidation are entitled to compensation, the 
appropriation over four years being HUF 50 billion, including HUF 12.5 billion in 2014. These 
consolation payments may have eased the discontent of the thrifty LGOs, but it did not repair the moral 
damage of the rescue campaign. The wanton spenders and the recipients under the earlier wave of 
consolidation were not penalized. The compensation payments went mainly to LGOs that had not 
received any consolidation monies, although who had received only small amounts, having managed 
relatively well earlier, received small amounts of compensation. Despite this, the principles of fair 
distribution were gravely damaged. 
The rescue of debt-ridden LGOs in the 2011–2013 period cannot be called a major event in 
macroeconomic terms. Still, it deserves notice for the message it bore. It boosted the expectations of 
decision-makers inclined to spend irresponsibly: their budget constraint is soft. It supports their self-
confidence: whatever they do they will survive and be bailed out. If they also possess good political 
connections, their chances and their slice of the national donation are still greater.  
This Appendix is merely an initial attempt to describe and analyze the LGO rescue campaign 
carried out in 2011–2013. It would take further research and the econometric analysis and interpretation 
of a mass of data to gain a full understanding of the factors behind the wave of indebtedness, the 






















Papers published in Volume IV of the Life’s Work Series 
 
1. Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems 
Original in English: Econometrica, Jul. 1979, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 801-819. 
Also in Hungarian (1978, 1998), Japanese (1979, 1983) and Estonian (1981). 
 
2. "Hard" and "Soft" Budget Constraint 
In English: Acta Oeconomica, 1980, Vol. 25, No. 3-4, pp. 231-246. Republished in: 40 Years of Research 
on Rent Seeking 2. Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Eds. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai 
A. Konrad, 2008. Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 569-583. 
Original in Hungarian (1980). Also in Portuguese (1983), French (1986) and Chinese (1987). 
 
3. Softness of the Budget Constraint—An Analysis Relying on Data of Firms, co-author: Ágnes 
Matits. 
In English: Acta Oeconomica, 1984, Vol. 32, No. 3-4, pp. 223-249. Republished: Eastern European 
Economics, 1987, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 1-33. 
Original in Hungarian (1983). Also in Japanese (1984, 1986) and Chinese (1986, 1987). 
 
4. Paternalism, Buyers' and Sellers' market, co-author: Jörgen Weibull 
Original in English: Mathematical Social Sciences, 1983, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 153-169.  
Also In Hungarian (1983) and Japanese (1986). 
 
5. The Soft Budget Constraint 
Original in English: Kyklos, 1986, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 3-30. Republished in English (1990). 
Also in Hungarian (1986, 1989), Japanese (1986) and Spanish (1992).  
 
6. Gomulka on the Soft Budget Constraint: A Reply 
Original in English: Economics of Planning, 1985, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 49-55.  
Also in Hungarian (1987) and Japanese (1988). 
 
7. The Evolution of Financial Discipline under the Postsocialist System 
In English: Kyklos, Fall 1993, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 315-336. Republished in: Europa und Ungarn. Ed.: 
Ferenc Glatz. Budapest: Europa Institut Budapest, 1996, pp. 75-90. 
Original in Hungarian (1993). Also in Russian (1994), German (1996), Slovak (1998), Bulgarian 
(1998), Romanian (2000) and Chinese (2003). 
 
8. Eliminating the Shortage Economy: A General Analysis and Examination of the Developments in 
Hungary 
In English: Economics of Transition, 1995, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 13-37 and No. 2, pp. 149-168. Original in 
Hungarian (1994). Also in Russian (1996), German (1996), Bulgarian (1998), Romanian (2000) and 
Chinese (2003). 
 
9. The Soft Budget Constraint Syndrome in the Hospital Sector 
In English: International Journal of Health Care Finance Economics, 2009, Vol. 9, pp. 117-135.  
Original in Hungarian (2008). Also in Japanese (2009). 
 
10. Hardening of the Budget Constraint: The Experience of the Post-Socialist Countries 
Original in English: European Economic Review, 2001, Vol. 45., No. 9. pp. 1573-1600.  
Also in Hungarian (2000) and Chinese (2004). 
 54 
 
11. Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint, co-authors Eric Maskin és Gérard Roland. 
Original in English: Journal of Economic Literature, 2003. Vol. 61. No. 4. pp. 1095-1136.  
Also in Chinese (2002), Hungarian (2004) and Russian (2004). 
 
12. The Soft Budget Constraint Syndrome and the Global Financial Crisis: Some Warnings from 
an East European Economist 
Original in English, in the blog of Willem Buiter associated with Financial Times with the introduction 
by Willem Buiter (October 14, 2009) http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/10/kornai-on-soft-budget-
constraints-bail-outs-and-the-financial-crisis/  
Also in Hungarian (2009), German (2009), Japanese (2009), Chinese (2009), Polish (2009) and 
Vietnamese (2009). 
 
13. Breaking Promises 
In English in: Aльманах Центрa Исследованный  Экономической Kультуры (Almanach of the 
Research Center of Economic Culture), ed. by Danila Raskov, Moscow: Gaidar Institute Press, 2013, 
pp. 210-243.  
Original in Hungarian (2012). Also Russian (2013), Romanian (2013), Russian (2013), Estonian (2014) 
and Latvian (2014). 
 
 
